Portland State University

PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations and Theses

2-28-1975

Reconciliation and reunion
Myron K. Jordan
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, European History Commons, and the United States History
Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Jordan, Myron K., "Reconciliation and reunion" (1975). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 2309.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.2306

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Myron K. Jordan for the Master
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Title:

Reconciliation and Reunion.

APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:

Throughout the period of the American Revolution,
Great Britain pursued a policy of reconciliation and reunion
toward its North American colonies.

While this was but one

of the several policy alternatives open to British leadership, it was always an element of British strategy toward
the colonies from 1775 to 1783.
This thesis follows the evolution of reconciliation
and reunion in the final days of crisis in 1774-1775.

It

seeks to define its development during the war itself, and
especially during the abortive American Peace Commission of
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1778.

By tracing this policy from its emergence through to

the peacemaking in 1782-1783, it shows its growth and analyzes its strengths and weaknesses as a coherent whole
rather than considering it in relation to particular events.
This provides an understanding of why reconciliation and
reunion had become the dominant and controlling policy
toward America at the time of the Anglo-American negotiations leading to the Treaty of Paris.
British policy in the critical period of the peacemaking at Paris from April, 1782 through February, 1783 was
predicated upon reconciliation and reunion with America.
However, insufficient weight has been given to this fact in
analyzing these events.

Benjamin Franklin's suggestion to

Richard Oswald, Britain's representative, in April, 1782
that Britain cede Canada to the United States has been considered either an inexplicable aberration in Franklin's
conduct, or simply labeled as baffling.

With an understand-

ing of British policy this event becomes a clear American
response to Britain, pointing out to Britain's leading advocate of reconciliation and reunion, Lord Shelburne, the
price which such a policy would require for American acceptance of a plan of reunion.
Most important of all is the role of reconciliation
and reunion in fixing the terms of the Treaty of Paris.

The

American historical record has emphasized the parts played
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by Franklin, John Jay and John Adams.

It has given far less

consideration and weight to that of Lord Shelburne, who as
Colonial Secretary and as First Lord of the Treasury, directed negotiations from the British side.

Shelburne's

advocacy of reconciliation and reunion set the outlines of
peace and contributed significantly to the terms.

The

reversal of British policy following Shelburne's fall in
February, 1783, and the failure of the new North-Fox Ministry to reach agreement on a commercial treaty with America
highlights the importance of Shelburne 1 s role.

Any evalua-

tion of American diplomacy at Paris to be comprehensive must
take into account the policies of Great Britai.n and their
impact on negotiations.

The accounting as developed in this

thesis, based upon primary materials available in the
Portland State University Library and the Bodleian Library
of Oxford University, demonstrates what has been hailed as
American diplomatic success is much more attributable to
British policy than to American efforts.
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CHAPTER I
THE NEGLECTED POLICY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION
American historians exploring the diplomacy of war and
peace during the American Revolution have mined a variety of
themes from this Mother Lode of diplomatic history.

But

their main conceptions of the events from 1773 to 1783 have
been shaped into an essentially simple confrontation between
good and evil.

That is, the American forces of independence

as symbolized by the diplomacy of Benjamin Franklin, John
Jay and John Adams are pitted against the efforts of King
George III's diplomats striving to reclaim for the British
Empire the lost North American colonies.

Thus, the climac-

tic diplomatic maneuvering at Paris in 1782 becomes in
the eyes of these historians an epic struggle for America's
survival as a nation.
"Their action," says Samuel Bemis of the American
negotiators at Paris,
was the first decisive step to loose a new nation
from Europe's bonds and Europe's distresses, so that
their people after them might have freedom to expand,
and to develop a new continent, to rise to surpassing power, and to do this during that century and a
half which was to follow before the industrial and
scientific revolutions of our times • • • • The
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greatest victory in the annals of American diplomacy
was won at the outset by Franklin, Jay and Adams.I
More recently Richard Morris has reaffirmed these
broad outlines of American diplomacy at Paris.
"What was so remarkable," he writes,
about the achievements of the American commissioners
was that where they compromised it was on the inessentials and where they conceded it was to yield
the trivial. From beginning to end they remained unswerving on the score of obtaining both absolute independence and a continental domain for thirteen
littoral states. On the main objectives of national
survival they proved uncompromising. Because the
American commissioners resolutely contended for the
right of a sovereign people to choose their own form
of government and because they secured grudging
recognition of that right from the Old Order, a free
people is eternally in their debt.2
These conceptions reflect some of the generally
accepted views of American diplomatic history in the revolutionary era.

Yet they are views with serious shortcomings.

They are constructed much more from hindsight than from the
contemporary realities of 1782.

They rest upon a broad

foundation of the American perception of national mission.
They also emphasize an unqualified acceptance of American
independence in 1782 as an essential to present national
existence.

They disregard the efforts made by both

Americans and English at reconciliation and reunion before
l

Samuel F. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American
Revolution (Bloomington, Indiana, 1957, 1935) p. 256.
2Richard B. Morris, The Peacemakers (New York, 1965)

p. 459.
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and during the war period.

And finally there is a signifi-

cant misreading of British policy and objectives at Paris in

1782. All of these factors combined pose an unanswered and
perhaps unanswerable question:

What impact did Britain's

policy of reconciliation and reunion have in the shaping of
the ultimate terms of the Treaty of Paris?
Both Bemis and Morris stress some common thoughts in
their paean of praise to the American commissioners at
Paris.
ence.

First, of course, is their achievement of independSecond, the wresting of sufficient territory from

Great Britain so that an expansionist sentiment in America
would not find itself thwarted for many years.

Third, the

clean break of all political ties between the new nation and
Europe, and what that presaged in·terms of national character and the sense of national mission.
The United States has indeed achieved and maintained
its national independence.

The achievement of that inde-

pendence in confrontation with the Old Order in Europe and
its establishment of a distinctive form of government from
what currently existed helped strengthen the sense of mission which is a pervasive theme throughout almost all
American historical writing.

It finds its earliest expres-

sion in the religious dedication of the New England
colonies, and the firmly expressed belief of their leaders
in God's guidance of their destiny.

4
The nationhood of America is a necessity to furtherance of the idea of mission.

It permitted Americans to view

themselves and their government as unique largely because of
the circumstances of their separation from the Old World and
their break with the links to the European past.

These con-

tribute to the idea that this nation is God's experiment in
religious, political and economic ideals in order to provide
leadership to the rest of the world.
No one has more effectively articulated America's own
belief in its mission to the world than its sixteenth president, Abraham Lincoln, in his Gettysburg address.

"

That this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom--and that government of the people, by the people, for
the people, shall not perish from the earth,"3 are simple
but powerful words which have conveyed to succeeding generations an urgent sense of America's belief in its own special
destiny.
It is a theme that has been repeated many times before
and since Lincoln's speech.

The same American sense of mis-

sion is easy to find in the justifications of America's
involvement in Cuba and in the Philippines in 1898.

In ask-

ing Congress to declare war on Germany, April 2, 1917,
President Woodrow Wilson sounded the same chords of mission.
3T. Harry Williams, A. Lincoln, Selected Speeches,
Messages and Letters (New York, 1957) p. 247.
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He said:
It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful
people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be
in the balance. But the right is more precious than
the peace, and we shall fight for the things we have
always carried nearest our hearts--for democracy, for
the right of those who submit to authority to have a
voice in their own governments, for the rights and
liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion
of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall
bring peace and safety to all nations and make the
world at last free.4
The same American sense of mission can be traced
through Franklin Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter and Harry
Truman's March 12, 1947 foreign policy message to Congress
or as it has become better known, the Truman Doctrine.

Mis-

sion is an ideal woven into the fabric of American history
from colonial beginnings.

It was re-dedicated through inde-

pendence in the eighteenth century and surges undiminished
down to the Viet-Nam conflict in the twentieth century.

And

because it is so fundamental to the thinking of Americans
it should be in no way surprising that those historians who
have written of the diplomacy of 1782 subconsciously shaped
their views to accommodate the idea of American mission.
What were the objectives of the English ministry in
regard to its North American colonies in the critical days
of 1773 to 1775 immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities?
4Harold C. Syrett, editor, American Historical
Documents (New York, 1960) p. 342.
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How did these British aims change with the shifting
fortunes of war in North America, the West Indies and
Europe?

What adjustments were made in British policy as new

European alliances threatened Great Britain?

Did other

developments within the Empire impinge upon the American
policy of Great Britain at critical moments?
What were the objectives pursued by the British ministry and its negotiators when faced with a major defeat at
Yorktown and a Parliamentary resolution demanding a halt to
offensive operations in North America?
Reconciliation and reunion were policies followed by
the English Ministry prior to Lexington in concert with the
Ministerial plan of coercion.

Reconciliation and reunion

were objectives pursued along with military action throughout the American hostilities.

And they were also prime

objectives of Lord Shelburne's representatives at the peace
negotiations of 1782 in Paris.
That Lord Shelburne, leader of the King's cabinet
during the peace negotiations, made the final desperate
effort to bridge the gap between Great Britain and its North
American colonies and achieve reconciliation and reunion is
well documented by British historians.

Vincent Harlow's

The- Founding of the Second British Empire contains a
detailed exploration of Lord Shelburne's belief in the possibility of a new relationship between England and the
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thirteen colonies.

Shelburne's biographer, Edmond Fitz-

maurice, perceived it as well.
He (Shelburne) saw the settlement not as surrender
to America under French pressure, nor even a reversal of North's blunders, but as the opening of a new
and more glorious period of British history. This
view of it he was unable, however, to make clear
either to his contemporaries or even to historians.
Shelburne believed that America might yet be kept
within the British area of influence even though he
was obliged to cede her independence.
To make it possible it was essential that Americans should concentrate their attention on the
interior of their continent and that they should
feel good will towards Great Britaln.5
A more recent British historian is equally explicit.
Shelburne
• • • saw that America could not be kept by force .
. But he hoped that the Americans might be content
with independence in the sense of running their
domestic affairs but would voluntarily unite their
foreign policy and co-ordinate their trade policy
with that of the King. All that was valuable in
the old connexion would then be preservect.6
Why should such a significant aspect of British

foreign policy in the American Revolution have received so
little attention from American historians?
Part of the answer has already been discussed--the
American idea of mission that is so accepted and so
fundamental it can be considered a part of the fiber of

5Edmond Fitzmaurice, Life of William Petty, Earl or

Shelburne (2 vols., London, 1912) II, 253.

6J. Steven Watson, The Reign of George III (Oxford,

1960) p. 249.
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American life.

It is also an idea that must rest upon a

foundation of independence.

The two thoughts support each

other, and because they are inseparable, both ideas have
become a premise to American historical thinking.

Most

Americans experience great difficulty in deliberately examining these ideas from an objective standpoint.
It is obvious that the idea of reconciliation and reunion is an outright denial of both American nationhood and
its corollary, American mission.

Even the consideration of

reconciliation and reunion in a revolutionary setting is
fraught with overtones of disloyalty.

The historian brave

enough to pursue these themes in a very young republic is
treading upon the treacherously thin ice of treason.

(It is

noteworthy few Americans saw fit to write contemporary biographies of such men as Benedict Arnold or Aaron Burr.)

Cer-

tainly it is a subject with little appeal to a popular
audience or an academic one.
So reconciliation and reunion have remained topics for
a relative few British historians to examine.

And even from

the British viewpoint the middle way policies of the Minis-

try in wartime and during the peace negotiations have drawn
minor interest.

The reasons are probably several.

The

architects of a peace ending a disastrous war seldom draw
accolades from their contemporaries or even later historians.

"Are we to be hanged or applauded for this
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rescuing you from the American war?" Henry Strachey, a member of the British negotiating team at Paris wrote to a
friend after the preliminary peace terms were disclosed.7
Lord Shelburne's ministry fell from power over the questions
raised by the Treaty of Paris, and Shelburne himself never
again held office.
The questions of loyalty and patrlotlsm were as crltical in England as they were in America.

To those in

England who saw American grievances as the conspiratorial
efforts at independence of a wrong-headed lot of colonial
tax dodgers, the idea of a genuine reconciliation and reunion remained as treasonable as the terms of the Treaty of
Paris.

Reconciliation with criminals is unacceptable

whether their crime be tax evasion or a conspiracy to split
off the North American colonies from the remainder of the
British Empire.
Writing to Lord Shelburne .about the imminent recognition of American independence on November 10, 1782, King
George III probably expressed the feelings of many of his
subjects toward America when he said:
I cannot conclude without mentioning how sensibly
I feel the dismemberment of America from this Empire, and that I should be miserable indeed if I
did not feel that no blame on that Account can be
laid at my door, and did I not also know that
knavery seems to be so much the striking feature

7Fitzmaurice, The Life of William Petty, Earl of
Shelburne, II, 207.
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of its Inhabitants that it may not in the end b~
an evil that they become Alien to this Kingdom.~
On the other hand, those few Englishmen who supported
the American cause and hence independence found themselves
trapped in the same American national ideology as most
American historians.

Reconciliation and reunion was as

treacherous a role for a British supporter of America as it
was for Americans.
Certainly, the middle way is the most difficult path
of all in an era of conflict.

And the middle way is pre-

cisely what reconciliation and reunion between the North
American colonies and Great Britain sought to accomplish.
It is easy to understand and define the policies of those
seeking American independence.

The goal is clear and sharp.

It is equally easy to delineate the ideas of those seeking
to restore loyalty to the Crown and Parliament through
colonial submission.

Extremes are usually easier to locate

than the slippery middle ground between dedicated advocates.
This policy of reconciliation and reunion was, however, a major thrust of British diplomacy throughout the
American Revolution and an overriding concern of Great
Britain at the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Paris.
Our task will be:

To gather the threads of this idea as it

8s1r John Fortescue, editor, Correspondence of K~~
George III (6 vols., London, 1928) VI, 154.
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was shared by both Americans and Britons in the years just
prior to 1776 and America's claim to independence.

To fol-

low the efforts of Lord North and Benjamin Franklin to find
the common grounds for accommodation in their secret negotiations of 1774 and 1775.

To examine the proposals for

conciliation Lord Howe brought to America in 1776, and look
again at the efforts of the Carlisle Commission in 1776.
And most important of all, to scrutinize with care the last
desperate hope for reconciliation and reunion in Lord
Shelburne's plan for peace with America as one of the elements in shaping the ultimate terms of the Treaty of Paris,

1782.
The questions to be answered are difficult ones:

How

much did Britain's policy of reconciliation and reunion contribute to what Bemis and Morris as well as other American
historians have seen as the triumph of tough, shrewd U.S.
diplomacy?

Why did British policy fall short of its objec-

tives?
In brief, has our American sense of mission blinded us
to the British perspective

~n

the Treaty of Paris, and mis-

led historians in their evaluation of what has been hailed
as the first and greatest success in American diplomacy?

CHAPTER II
ACCOMMODATION--ANOTHER WORD FOR
RECONCILIATION AND REUNION
The threads of reconciliation and reunion between
Great Britain and America can be easily discerned at many
points in the years between the Peace of Paris (1763) and
the Treaty of Paris (1783).
starting point is 1774.

For our purposes, the best

It was a year that produced un-

mistakable evidence of the increasing strains on the
imperial ties linking Britain and America.

But it also gave

indications of the strong counterforces to separation.
There were developments that pointed to both British and
American desires for accommodation and continuation of the
American colonies within the Empire.
It was a critical year both from the standpoint of
Great Britain and the colonists.

Reacting to the mob vio-

lence of the Boston Tea Party in December, 1773, Lord North,
First Lord of the Treasury and thus head of the Cabinet, on
March 7, 1774 told Commons it was His Majesty's intention,
" • • • to put an immediate stop to the present disorders
• • •

The King's message also asked Parliament to

1 The Parliamentary History of England (29 vols.
London, 1814 New York, 1966 ) XVII, 1159.
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• • • take into their most serious consideration,
what further regulations and permanent provisions
may be necessary to be established, for better
securing the execution of the laws and the Just
dependance Lsic) of the colonies upon the crown and
parliament of Great Britain.2
In retrospect, North was painfully aware of the errors
of his predecessors, Rockingham, Chatham and Grafton.

Back-

ing and filling in the face of colonial intransigence had
been a total failure.

Weakness on the part of England when

confronted with threats of non-importation or intimidation
of the King's officials by American mobs had been followed
by the repeal of legislation intended to equalize the burden of taxation between England and the colonies.

The end

result of these compromises had led to nothing more than new
violence and further intimidation.

North, the King and the

Ministry were convinced a new policy of firmness toward the
American colonies was a necessity.
Between March and June, 1774, the North Ministry
introduced to Parliament and won approval by substantial
majorities of a series of measures designed to establish
beyond doubt its imperial authority in America.
to pass was the Boston Port Bill.

The first

It closed the Port of

Boston to commerce until the East India Company had been
paid for its loss in tea.

The Boston Customs House was re-

located in Salem as was the seat of Provincial Government by
the same Act.

The American Board of Customs was also trans-
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ferred to Salem.

North pointed out there was ample prece-

dent for the punishment of an entire community for the acts
of individuals.

II

Boston had been the ringleader in

all riots," North declared,
and had at all times shown a desire of seeing the
laws of Great Britain attempted in vain, in the
colony of Massachusetts Bay. That the act of the
mob in destroying the tea, and other proceedings
belonged to the act of a public meeting, and that
. . . other colonies were peaceable and well inclined towards the trade of this country . •
3
While the Boston Port Bill was directed at Boston and
its street mobs, the Bill for regulating the Government of
Massachusetts Bay had broader implications.
its purpose.

North outlined

"I propose, in this Bill," he told Commons on

March 28, 1774,
to take the executive power from the hands of the
democratic- part of government; I would propose, that
the governor should act as a justice of peace, and
that he should have the power to appoint the officers throughout the whole civil authority, such as
sheriffs, provost marshal, &c . • • • I would have
them only removable by His Majesty . . • Every
gentleman will naturally see the impropriety of such
irregular assemblies, or town meetings, which are
now held in Boston; I would have them brought under
some regulation, and would not suffer them to be
held without consent of the governor, unless upon
the annual election of certain officers . • • •
Their juries are improperly chosen.4
In brief, the Bill for regulating the government of
Massachusetts Bay as proposed by North and approved by

3Ibid., p. 1165.
4

Ibid., p. 1193.
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Parliament was a drastic revision of the colony's charter.
The elected council to the royal governor was eliminated in
favor of a council nominated by the King.

The elected

assembly was stripped of its appointive powers, and the
governor given authority to appoint and dismiss all subordinate officials, including local sheriffs and judges.

Town

meetings were limited to one per year, and their role constrained to local matters.

Only the governor could

authorize additional town meetings.5
The significance of the Massachusetts Bay Act was
plain in both England and America.

There was a new tough-

ness of mind, and firmness of policy in the Ministry. The
words ". • . ju st dependance ••• 116 were not mere Parliamentary rhetoric.

They were an articulation of policy which

was about to be supported by concerted action.
The third item on North's legislative agenda for
colonial reform in the spring of 1774 was the Bill for the
Impartial Administration of Justice in Massachusett's Bay.
"Unless," North explained," such a Bill as this now proposed
should pass into law, the executive power will be unwilling
to act, thinking they will not have a fair trial without

1t."7 In final form, this measure permitted persons accused
5rb1d.
6Ibid., p. 1159
7rbid., p. 1200
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of capital crimes in the performance of their official
duties to have their trials transferred to another colony or
to Great Britain if they chose.
The capstone to North's program was a Quartering Act.
It gave colonial governors greater authority in lodging
troops in uninhabited houses, barns and farm structures, and
if need be in private homes.

North was clearly prepared to

back up the instruments of his new hard-line policy in
America, the King's officials, with force and military
power.

"The Americans have tarred and feathered your sub-

jects," he told Parliament in the course of the debate on
the Administration of Justice Act,
plundered your merchants, burnt your ships, denied
all obedience to your laws and authority; yet so
clement, and so long forbearing has our conduct been,
that it is incumbent on us now to take a different
course. Whatever may be the consequence, ~e must
risk something; if we do not, all is over.
All four measures achieved substantial majorities in
both houses of Parliament despite the opposition of the
Chatham faction, Edmund Burke and a handful of dissenters.
It seems evident from the ease with which North's policy
gained Parliamentary support that his position indeed reflected the views of a majority of the politically active
British public.
Americans quickly lumped the so-called coercive acts-that is, North's four-point program of re-establishing the

8 Ibid., p. 1280.
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Just dependance of the colonies on Great Britain--with the
Quebec Act.

The five legislative matters relating to North

America considered by Parliament in the spring of 1774 were
thus deemed to constitute a single category of deliberately
inflammatory legislation aimed at America.

The connection,

however, appears to be more a matter of coincidence in
timing than a single overall plan.
The need to establish an appropriate form of civil
government for Canada was long-standing.

The Quebec Act,

approved in June, 1774 immediately following North's first
four proposals regarding colonial matters, was an effort to
recognize the French culture and Roman Catholic·religion of
the inhabitants of the territory won from France in the
Peace of Paris (1763).

By

extending the Quebec boundary

southward along the Pennsylvania border and the Ohio River
it was hoped to stabilize the Indian frontier and reduce the
recurring

fr~ction

between land-hungry colonists and

Indians.

From the British viewpoint, it was a statesmanlike

recognition of the special needs of Canadians for a responsive government in that territory.

It appeared to offer

equally hopeful means toward controlling defense requirements by eliminating the source of Indian reaction--colonial
incursions westward.

Only a petition from the Penns point-

ing out the possible conflict between their colonial grant
and the new Quebec boundaries reflected any American concern
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in the Parliamentary debate on the Act.

Lord North dis-

missed the question as a misinterpretation.9
The combination of the four coercive acts plus the
Quebec Act raised the tensions between Great Britain and the
colonies to a new level.

The four acts aimed at restoring

the King's peace in Massachusetts Bay were a long overdue
step toward firmness in confronting the issues of radicalism and rioting.

From the London perspective it was ex-

pected that singling out Massachusetts would divide the
colonists among themselves and encourage rival ports in the
Middle and Southern colonies to prosper at the expense of
Boston. 10 The reform of the Massachusetts Bay charter would
serve as a warning to radicals in other colonies to temper
their speech and actions in their assemblies as well as to
make them more respectful in their dealings with royal
governors.

Providing an option for moving trials of offi-

cials to other colonies or England would rally the support
of those loyal to the King and stiffen the backbones of
those charged with enforcing the laws of the Empire.

And

finally, the Quartering Act would make clear the responsibilities of the colonists in making a minimal contribution
to the forces bringing law and order amongst them and in
defending them against Indian attack.
9rbid., p. 1407.
10 Ibid., p. 11 6 5.

19
Logical and reasonable though North's policies may
have appeared to Parliament and to Britons, it ignited an
explosion of reaction on the American side of the Atlantic.
Calls arose for a cessation of trade with Britain.

Com-

mittees of safety organized and gathered supplies.

For the

first time since 1765 and the Stamp Act crisis colonial
assemblies voted to send delegates to a Continental Congress.

Militia companies formed and drilled.

There

remained in the face of these preparations, however, solid
evidence of an American desire for accommodation and continued union with Great Britain.
When the First Continental Congress met in September,

1774 in Philadelphia, it gave serious consideration to a
Plan of Union proposed by Joseph Galloway, former speaker of
the Pennsylvania Assembly.

Galloway's plan called for the

establishment of a Grand Council of representatives chosen
by

the legislatures of all British colonies in North

America.

A President-General, appointed by the King, would

act as chief executive.

The Council's power would extend

to all matters of a commercial, civil, criminal or police
character, but reserve to the Parliament in Great Britain
the prerogatives of defense and foreign affairs.

The Grand

Council would have had veto power over measures affecting
the North American colonies passed by Parliament.

Likewise,
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Parliament would have retained veto power over acts of the
Grand Council. 11
Galloway later praised those who supported his proposal in Congress for seeking" . . . to form a more solid
and constitutional union between the two countries, and to
avoid every measure which tended to sedition •

1112

But

Congress was split into two factions, Galloway observed.
The one were men of legal principles and possessed
the greatest fortunes in America; the others were
congregational and presbyterian republicans, or men
of bankrupt fortunes, overwhelmed in debt to the
British merchants.13
Indeed, Galloway noted that one of the delegates to Congress, Samuel Adams of Massachusetts Bay, openly admitted
he had been toiling for twenty years to destroy AngloAmerican ties and to bring about American independence. 14
Despite its failure, the Galloway plan was evidence
that many Americans--perhaps most Americans--still thought
of themselves as British subjects and their rights secured
by the English constitution.

The same Congress which set

aside Galloway's plan voted a declaration of rights and

11 Richard B. Morris, editor, The American Revolution,
1763-1783 (New York, 1970) p. 128.
12Joseph Galloway, Historical and Political Reflec-

tions on the Rise and Progress of the American Rebellion
TLondon, 1 780) p .06 .
13
Ib1d.

14

Ibid., p. 67.
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resolves.

Among the rights claimed were,

That our ancestors, who first settled these colonies, were at the time of their emigration from the
mother country, entitled to all the rights, liberties and immunities of free and natural-born subjects within the realm of England. That by such
emigration they by no means forfeited, surrendered
or lost any of these rights, but that they were,
and their descendents now are, entitled to the exercise and enjoyment of all such of them . . • • 15
Congress addressed this appeal to Parliament, declaring it was acting" . . . as Englishmen their ancestors in
like cases have usually done, for asserting and vindicating
their rights and liberties . . . . 16
The Declaration concluded:
To these grievous acts and measures Americans cannot submit, but in hopes that their fellow subjects
in Great Britain will, on revision of them, restore
us to that state in which both countries found happiness and prosperity • . • • 17
The Congressional petition outlining American grievances was
presented to the American Secretary, Lord Dartmouth, by
Benjamin Franklin, agent for Pennsylvania in London.

It was

accepted by Parliament with a bundle of other colonial correspondence without discussion or answer. 18
1 5Harold

C. Syrett, editor, American Historical Documents (New York, 1960) p. 75.

16 Ibid.
17
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In England men were also trying to devise a new relationship between Great Britain and the colonies that would
solve the growing frictions.

As early as 1770, an anonymous

London pamphleteer had suggested colonial representation in
Parliament under the title, Considerations on the Expediency
of Admitting Representatives from the American Colonies into
the British House of Commons.

After commenting on separa-

tion, "Such a disunion would be a dreadful event both to
Great Britain and America . . . "

19

the unknown author in-

sisted that America's interests were already represented
in Commons by the British merchants trading to America.
Representation, however, he predicted, would quiet American
grievances.
About fourscore persons might be admitted to sit in
Parliament as members of the Commons House of Parliament for all the King's dominions in America, the
West Indies as well as North America, and their title
might be bhat of Commissioners of the Colonies of
America.2
The difficulties of transatlantic travel were so great the
pamphlet proposed the American Commissioners would continue
to sit without the necessity of standing for re-election
until they were challenged.
Another 1775 pamphlet issued in London by T. Beckett,
printer, declared,
l9Anonymous, Considerations on the Expediency of
Admitting Representatives from the American Colonies into
the British House of Commons (London, 1770) p. 3.
20
Ibid., p. 10.
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If receiving representatives from America be practicable, why not admit them? If it is proper to incorporate the colonies and make them a part of the
parent-state instead of distant provinces, why not
deliberate about it?21
But Major John Cartwright, whose American Independence, the Interest and Glory of Great Britain, also appeared
in a London pamphlet in 1775, argued against American representation in Parliament for a number of reasons.

The small

number of American representatives in Commons would make
their role ineffectual, he pointed out.
practical considerations.

There were also

Should Americans be permitted the

privilege of debate and a vote on all matters before Commons
22
or only on questions concerning the colonies?
The thought
of American members of Parliament perhaps casting the critical votes on the taxes of Bristol merchants or Kentish
farmers was beyond even Cartwright's imagination.

Given the

hazards and slowness of North Atlantic travel, how would
_Americans at Westminister visit their constituents and sit
in Parliament? 2 3 After raising these questions, Cartwright
'•

concluded, "But we may rest assured, that while Americans
are awake, they will never consent to it. 1124
21Anonymous, A Plain State of the Arguments Between
Great Britain and Her Colonies (London, 1775) p. 18.
22John Cartwright, American Independence, the Interest
and Glory of Great Britain (London, 1775) p. 9.
2 3Ibid.

24 Ib1d.
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Cartwright's alternative to representation in Parliament--a surprising one for a former British naval officer
who had served on the Newfoundland station--was American
independence of special kind.

Cartwright pointed out that

" • • • the American governments .

are independent

nations, having within themselves the rights and the actual
powers of legislation . . • . 112 5

Cartwright foresaw the day

when the benefits of the British constitution would gradually extend over North America 11 • • • to as many independent states as can find habitations on the vast American
continent

1126

Cartwright's use of the word "inde-

pendence" takes on a somewhat novel connotation as he pursues his theme.
In analyzing the impasse of 1775, Cartwright leaned on
another frequent commentator on American politics and trade,
Josiah Tucker, Dean of Gloucester Cathedral.

Tucker,

according to Cartwright, identified five possible solutions
to the American problem.

First, Britain could permit mat-

ters to drift as they were in early 1775 with constant bickering and threats between t.he two parties.

Second, Great

Britain could meet American grievances by offering representation in Parliament.

Third, Britain could throw the

weight of its army and navy against the colonists and rule

25Ibid., p. 22.
26~., p. 27.
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America by force--a project ex-naval officer Cartwright
thought might require considerable time and expense.
Fourth, it could consider moving the seat of the British
Empire to North America and rule England from thence as a
colony.

Fifth, it could grant independence to the colo-

nies.27
Tucker's fifth option was the only one worth seriously
considering, Cartwright said, and declared he looked forward
to the day" . • . when Great Britain shall once have done
justice to the Americans, by an open declaration of their
independence, and by offering them her friendship. 1128
For Cartwright saw American independence leading to a
II

• Grand British League and Confederacy to be entered

into by All the States of British America. 112 9

It would be

accomplished by an Act of Parliament separating the colonies
from the United Kingdom, but at the same time including
. • . in another clause . . . that "the Parliament of
Great Britain doth further declare itself to be the
guardian and protector of said states and colonies
• • • against every foreign power whatsoever • . • " 30
2 7Ibid., p. 47.
28 Ibid., p.
57.
29

Ibid., p. 1.

30ib1d., p. 63.
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The same act, according to Cartwright, should direct Parliament to enter into a treaty with America
• in order that a firm, brotherly, and perpetual league may be concluded between Great
Britain and them [the American colonies) for their
mutual commercial "'benefit, and their joint security against all other kingdoms and states • • . • 31
King George III would continue in his role as King of
America, Cartwright was hopeful, and expressed his conviction that a grateful America would rely on Great Britain for
military and naval protection under what might be described
today as dominion status.
'Tis absurd to imagine they will act in contradiction to the principles of self-interest and selfpreserva ti on, merely because they shall be free from
controul; nor is it more possible to conceive, how
they should object to a treaty with Great Britain
merely because she had just done them an act of
magnanimity and generosity unparalleled in history

. • . • 32

Cartwright brought his entire thesis into perspective with
this blunt, closing admonition:

"In short, the multiplying

millions of America must either be our deadly foes, or our
steadfast friends--Great Britain take the choice~ 11 33
Men in government as well as pamphleteers sought to
find the elusive common ground of successful accommodation.
In August, 1774, Franklin, as a colonial agent in London,
3libid.
32 Ibid., p. 67.

33 rbid., p. 68.
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met with the aging Lord Chatham, William Pitt the Elder, at
Chatham's urging.3 4

It opened the way for Franklin to dis-

cuss with Chatham American grievances and the means of satisfying them.

As the American situation worsened, Chatham

introduced a conciliation motion in the House of Lords on
January 20, 1775.

It was swiftly defeatect.35

Chatham

returned to the struggle on February 1st, introducing a bill
aimed at resolving the differences between Britain and the
colonies.

It proposed to permit the colonial assemblies all

rights of taxation, but acknowledged the supremacy of Parliament in matters of Empire trade regulation and defense.
Acts passed by Parliament since 1763 to which the colonies
objected would have been repealed.
was quickly defeated.36

Again Chatham's proposal

Not even· a person of Pitt's stature

was capable of deflecting the North Ministry from its course
in America.
Another member of Parliament who spoke out for conciliation was Edmund Burke, whose classic address on conciliation with America introduced his resolutions on reconciliatlon March 22, 1775.

Like Chatham, Burke thought in

terms of a return to pre-1763 conditions, the beginning in
34Albert Smyth, editor, The Writings of Benjamin
Franklin (New York, 1906) VI, 318.
35Parl1amentary History
36Ib1d., XVIIL 167.

XVII~ 149.
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the minds of many of the deterioration in Anglo-American
relationships.

He also asked for a repeal of the acts to

which the colonists objected, and granting to the colonies
of the rights of taxation.

His resolutions were defeated in

Commons, 270-78.37
While Burke and Chatham attempted to bring about conciliation or at least present its values in Parliament,
there was also intrigue behind the scenes in the winter of
1774-1775.

It involved Franklin and individuals who proba-

bly represented the North Ministry.

There is every indica-

tion that Quaker merchant David Barclay, the mysterious
Dr. John Fothergill, Admiral Lord Richard Howe and Lord
Howe's sister were acting with the knowledge, if not at the
direction of members of the Cabinet.

At the very least

these people reflected the thinking and the hopes of an
influential segment of British society which sincerely
sought accommodation with America.
The tale as recounted by Franklin began with a visit
from Barclay in early December, 1774, and a suggestion that
Franklin prepare a list, outlining the terms of a settlement
which would satisfy the American colonists.38

Barclay told

Franklin his suggestions would be passed on to his friend,
37 Ibid., XVIII,215.

38smyth, The Writings of Ben.Jamin Franklin, V~ 341.
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Dr. Fothergill, who was in daily contact with the American
Secretary, Lord Dartmouth.39

Franklin protested he had no

authority to speak for the Continental Congress, and could
only make suggestions such as appeared to him would assist
in bringing about an accommodation.

After further prodding

from Barclay, Franklin produced a list of "HINTS FOR CONVERSATION upon the Subject of Terms that mlght probably produce
a durable Union between Britain and the Colonies. 1140
Franklin's hints included suggestions that the tea
destroyed in Massachusetts might be paid for if Parliament
would repeal the Massachusetts Bay Regulating Act, the
Quebec Act and refrain from altering charters, constitutions
or laws of any colony.

Franklin proposed Britain grant the

right of free trade to the colonies in exchange for permanent grants of money from the colonies.

Or if Britain

yielded the right of taxation, it could exercise full regulation of colonial trade.

Finally, Franklin suggested

Parliament should repeal some act of legislation seen as
oppressive by the colonies as an expression of its sincerity.

Franklin thought a good choice might be the Declar-

atory Act, asserting Parliamentary supremacy over the colonies. 41
39Ibid., p. 327.

40Ibid., p. 328.
41 Ib1d., pp. 328,329,330.
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Later Franklin learned that Lord Dartmouth was in
agreement with some of his proposals and had rejected
others.

The intricate negotiations continued through Jan-

uary and February, 1775 with Barclay and Fothergill relaying
modifications between Franklin and Dartmouth. 42 The end of
the negotiations came February 20, 1775 after Lord North's
conciliatory proposals were introduced in Parliament.
Franklin was invited to wait on Lord Hyde, an associate of
the American Secretary, Dartmouth.

Hyde indicated that

Franklin's hints fell short of what the North Ministry expected and Hyde apparently believed Franklin had powers or
instructions from Congress for terms more favorable to
England's viewpoint.

Subsequently, the intermediaries,

Barclay and Fothergill, urged Franklin to stand by his hints
as a basis for accommodation. 43
This interlude paralleled in time Franklin's chess
•

games with the sister of Lord Richard Howe.

The invitation

to meet the lady for chess came the same day as Franklin's
first contact with Barclay and Fothergill about terms.
The first visit on De.cember 4, 1774 led to subsequent
chess invitations to Franklin, and a meeting between
Franklin and Lord Howe on December 25, 1775.

Howe asked

Franklin for a list of the terms that would satisfy the
42 Ibid., p. 359.
43Ibid., p. 393.
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colonists and resolve the dispute between Great Britain and
America.

He also revealed he had a copy of the "hints"

Franklin had given David Barclay.

According to Franklin's

recollection, the conversation included the suggestion

"

• • that he [Lord Howe] should not think of influencing

me by any selfish motive, but certainly I might with reason
expect any Rewards in the Power of Government to bestow 1144
should a mutually satisfactory formula result from his
(Franklin's) proposals.
Lord Howe's connections with the Ministry found
Franklin's proposals for colonial reconciliation no more
palatable than did Barclay's.

Lord Howe's final bid was an

offer to make Franklin the secretary of a Peace Commission
to America.

Franklin declined, saying he could not under-

take such an assignment without full knowledge and concurrence with the terms under which the Peace Commission was
to proceed. 45
The significant aspect of both the Barclay-Fothergill
intrigue, and Lord Howe's efforts to sway Franklin's views
on reconciliation between Britain and America was that they
took place.

They were further indications that Americans

and Englishmen still thought of themselves as a single

44 Ibid., p. 353.
4 5Ibid., p. 385 .

•
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nation.

They demonstrated that among the British leadership

there were still forces seeking the means to keep the two
peoples under a common allegiance.
Franklin, however, found much in England that encouraged him to look in a new direction.

Writing to Joseph

Galloway shortly before his departure for America in March,
1775, he noted,
• • • • I cannot apprehend more Mischief than Benefit from a closer Union. I fear they will drag us
after them in all the plundering Wars, which their
desperate Circumstances, Injustice and Rapacity may
prompt them to undertake; and their wide-wasting
Prodigality and Profusion is a Gulph that will swallow up every Aid we may distress ourselves to afford
them. Here Numberless and Needless Places, enormous
salaries, Pensions, Perquisites, Bribes, groundless
quarrels, foolish expeditions, false accounts or no
Accounts, Contracts and Jobs devour all Revenue, and
produce continual necessity . • . • I apprehend that
to unite us intimately will only be to corrupt and
poison us also.46
Lord North's conciliatory proposals of February 20,
1775--even if thus labeled--represented no genuine desire
for accommodation.

The terms of the· proposal were a simple

restatement of Ministerial policy.

The colonies were to tax

themselves for imperial revenues so long as Parliament
approved of the amount collected and the colonies remitted
this to England.

Meanwhile, Parliament reserved to itself

the right to regulate colonial commerce through taxation.
fl

..•

it will have been just, it will have been humane,

that we held out the terms of peace," North said before

46

Ibid., p. 312.
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Commons.

"If they reject it, their blood must be upon their

own hearts.

But I have better hopes:

there are people, and

I hope whole colonies, that wish for peace; and by these
means, I hope they will find their way to it. 114 7
Others were less generous and North's proposals were
immediately attacked by the pro-American elements in Parliament.

Later evaluators have been equally harsh.

"It was

not even a halfway measure for peace; it was a stupid gesture," is one historian's evaluation. 48

The dissenting

views expressed in Parliament reached colonial newspapers in
America quickly and were widely reproduced.
events outran North's proposal.

Meanwhile,

By the time word had

reached America, first blood had been shed at Lexington and
Concord.

Neither the Americans nor the Ministry were now in

a mood to consider seriously steps toward reconciliation.
Yet Americans held back from the act of separation as well.
There was still another effort in Congress to make an
appeal to the people of Great Britain.

In colonial eyes,

Lexington, Concord and Bunker Hill had demonstrated the
mettle of colonial troops and the vast consequences to
Great Gritain of suppressing American grievances by force.
The Continental Congress on July 8, 1775 approved a second
47Parliamentary History, XVIII; 322.

48 Weldon A. Brownj Em~ire or Independence (Port
Washington, N.Y., [1941 19 6) p. 45.
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petition to the King seeking reconciliation.
written by Pennsylvania's John Dickinson.

It was largely

The so-called

Olive Branch petition appealed for a compact between King
and colonies defining the rights of each.

It proposed as a

basis for agreement that if Great Britain would surrender on
the taxation issue, the colonies would agree to Britain's
right to regulate their trade; or, for the right of free
trade, the colonies proposed to raise their appropriate
share of Empire revenues.

These were in essence the same

terms which Franklin had transmitted to the North Ministry
through BarclRy and Fothergill earlier in 1775. 4 9
Richard Penn was prevailed upon to deliver the petition.

He presented it on August 21st to Lord Dartmouth,

who declined to accept it until September 1st.

On August

25, 1775, the American colonies were declared by King
George III to be in a state of rebellion.

The petition was

summarily rejected by Commons on November 10th.50

Though

the results of the Olive Branch petition were nil, it demonstrated again that some Americans still believed reconciliation was attainable despite the stresses of 1775.

And the

forms and methods followed remained within the framework of
what colonists perceived as the English constitution.

49syrett, American Historical Documents, p. 78.
P~

50Bargar, Lord Dartmouth and the American Revolution,
159.
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The Howe Commission of 1776 was another attempt to
bring about reconciliation.

The brothers Howe, Sir William,

commander-in-chief of British Armies in America, and Lord
Richard, commander-in-chief of British Naval forces in
America, were also authorized to restore the peace.

Under

instructions concurred in by the North Ministry, the Howes
could pardon individuals and groups for treason, and after a
colony, town, port, district or place had renewed its alleglance to the king, it could once more enter into trade.5 1
To recover full legal status; however, all provincial congresses, committees, conventions and associations had to be
dissolved and the King's officials allowed to return to
authority.

Colonial armies were required to disband.

All

forts and military bases were to be restored to British contro1.52
After these preliminary steps were taken, the peace
commissioners were directed to order elections for a new
legislature.

The next requirement would be repayment to

Loyalists for lost or damaged property.

Once this was out

of the way discussions could commence on the annual contri-

bution each colony would thereafter make to the British
exchequer.

Each colony was to be permitted to raise its

51 Brown, Empire or Independence, p. 82.
5 2 Ibid • , p . 8 3 •

contribution in any way it chose--except taxes on Britishcolonial trade were excluded.

In addition, the Commis-

sioners were told to pursue reforms in the colonial charters
along the lines of those established for Massachusetts by
the Massachusetts Bay Regulating Act.

These were a

strengthened Governor's council appointed by the King;
judges commissioned in the same manner as those in England;
and various other reforms.

The Connecticut and Rhode Island

charters were especially designated as needing revision.53
The Prohibitory Act authorizing the King's representatives to grant pardons and carry out conciliation was passed
by Parliament in December, 1775.

The detailed instructions

of the peace commissioners were not completed until May 6,

1776, shortly before Lord Howe sailed for America, May 12th.
Thus, rumors and reports of the terms brought by the peace
commissioners had every opportunity to reach America before
the arrival of Lord Howe.

Proponents of independence had

time in which to act and they did.

Howe arrived in America

in mid-July about two weeks after Congress had decided on
independence.
The motives which moved Congress to declare for independence in July, 1776, are a question much beyond the scope
of this discussion.

53 Ibid.

Surface evidence, however, would seem
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to indicate a knowledge by Congress of the Howe Peace Commission and the terms it brought contributed at least to the
timing of the Declaration.

Some members of Congress sought

to delay a decision on independence until the reconciliation
which was to be offered by Lord Howe was explored.

In the

end Congress took the step toward independence before Howe
reached America.5 4
Through proclamations and communications directed to
Congress Lord Howe made known the terms of his Peace Commission.

The letters to Congress were never formally accepted

since Howe could not address that body directly.

Nonethe-

less, a Committee reviewed and rejected the Howe terms.55
General John Sullivan, an American captured at the
Battle of Long Island, and then paroled, brought word to
Congress of Lord Howe's reported willingness--and authority
--to redress grievances beyond the published peace terms.
Howe asked a committee from Congress to confer with him in
their private capacities. 56 A bitter debate within Congress
finally produced a decision to send Benjamin Franklin, John
Adams and Edward Rutledge as a Congressional committee--not
private citizens--to meet with Howe on Staten Island, September 11, 1776.

54Ibid., p. 105.
55 Ibid., p. 112.
56
Ibid., p.
116.

After preliminary fencing over whether either Lord
Howe or the Congressional delegation were acting in their
official capacities, the group settled down to a discussion
of conciliation as private persons.

Lord Howe suggested as

a first step toward peace the Americans withdraw the Declaration of Independence.

Franklin replied that Lord Howe

could probably obtain revised instructions from his government in London more quickly than the colonists retreat from
their independence.

When Franklin tested whether Howe would

forward American proposals to London, Howe avoided a direct
answer.

Howe indicated he doubted the propriety of his

accepting or transmitting them to London.57
At this point it was obvious that General Sullivan had
misunderstood or Lord Howe failed to explain his position.
The Admiral's authority was strictly limited to those terms
of conciliation with which Congress was already familiar.
The last face to face meeting between British and American
representatives seeking conciliation came to a halt.

The

meeting had lasted only about three hours, including a preliminary dinner and the lengthy quarrel over whether the
negotiators were acting in their official capacities or as
private individuals.
The years 1774, 1775 and 1776 had produced dedicated
efforts

by

men and goverrunents in both Britain and America

~ Ibid., p. 12 4 •
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aimed at conciliating their differences and discovering an
accommodation for a continuation of the mutual relationship.
All of these efforts failed.

Inevitably, Lord North and the

Ministry he headed can be assigned a major share of the
responsibility for failure.

The hard-line policy of coer-

cion initiated in 1774 produced a climate of despair in
which no efforts at conciliation could thrive.

The so-

called conciliatory proposals of 1775 and the Howe Peace
Commission fell far short of most American expectations.
Nonetheless, North's coercive measures were supported by
consistent Parliamentary majorities--some indication that
his actions were within the framework of British public
opinion.
Perhaps the major shortcoming of British policy was
its duality of purpose.

The Parliamentary program of 1774

was accompanied by the movement of British troops to Massachusetts.

Their commander, Sir Thomas Gage, was also

appointed the royal governor with instructions to implement
the measures of firmness and reform passed by Parliament.
Britain became instantly vulnerable to colonial accusations
that traditional freedoms were being trampled when political
policies were executed by troop commanders vested with royal
governorship.
In addition, the North Ministry failed to support in
any way the moderate Americans and their proposals.

This
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tended to drive those who supported the Galloway plan or
other means of conciliation either into the ranks of the
independence faction or into the arms of the Tories.

The

nucleus of the conciliation faction never had a chance to
coalesce or expand its membership through a natural process
encouraged by modest support from London.

The summary

rejection or disregard of petitions from Congress cut the
ground from under those Americans whose thinking and action
might have delayed independence while a compromise was being
sought.
Thus, those Americans such as Samuel Adams, Thomas
Paine and others dedicated to breaking the bonds between the
North American colonies and England were able to portray the
North Ministry in most conspiratorial hues.

The combination

of military force and hard-line political policy could be
made to appear as a deliberate effort aimed at reducing the
colonies to complete subjection.

Disregard of petitions

framed in traditional phrases appealing to English constitutional bulwarks only made the work of these propagandists
easier.
Franklin's indirect negotiations with Lord Dartmouth
could have been the catalyst for formal meetings on a new
relationship between the colonies and Great Britain.
Franklin was undoubtedly the most widely known and best
equipped American in England to represent the colonial view-

41
point.

However, the Hutchinson letters incident, in which

letters from the Royal governor of Massachusetts to friends
in England fell into Franklin's hands and were subsequently
published in America, gravely weakened Franklin's position.
He was "vilified" by the Solicitor General Alexander
Wedderburn in a hearing before the Privy Council on January
29, 1774.58

Under these circumstances it was impossible for

the North Ministry to pursue reconciliation openly through
Franklin, and provides at least a Pl:l.rtiRl explanation for
the

discree~

use of intermediaries such as Barclay, Fother-

gill and Lord Howe's sister in the winter of 1774-1775.
By the spring of

1775 there was little time .or room

left for political maneuver.

The majorities which defeated

both Chatham's and Burke's moves for conciliation indicated
a solid base of Parliamentary support for North's policies.
Once conflict began in Massachusetts at Lexington and
Concord conciliation became increasingly difficult.

The

early battles convinced colonists of their ability to withstand at least the military threat aimed at them.

A major

battle, Bunker Hill, was fought and an invasion of Canada
launched, and still Congress held back from the final step
of independence.

This underlines again the point that a

faction of Congress representing a segment of colonial
opinion still held hopes for conciliation.
S8M1chael G. Kammen, A Rope of Sand (New York, 1974)

p. 285.
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The Howe Commission with its overtones of duplicity-again a combination of political and military purposes-repeated the errors of Gage in Massachusetts.

Those

dedicated to independence found an easy target in attacking
British motives in sending a military commander as a peace
commissioner, and whose only terms were pardons to those who
submitted to their previous allegiance.

These failures in

combination with all of the profound misunderstandings of
America held by British officialdom and coupled with
American mistrust of the distant bureaucracy in London made
accommodation a fruitless search in 1774, 1775 and 1776.

CHAPTER III
THE CARLISLE COMMISSION AND
RECONCILIATION
Early December, 1777 brought the North Ministry face
to face with a major military disaster in North America.
The American Secretary, Lord Germain, admitted in Commons on
December 3rd that disturbing reports of a battle at Saratoga
in the province of New York had reached him. 1 The Canada
Expedition under the command of Sir John Burgoyne had met a
serious setback.

Indeed, if the preliminary reports were

confirmed, it appeared the combined force of British and
German troops as well as Indian irregulars had been surrounded by colonial regulars and militia, and had surrendered.

The reports were confirmed.

of 8,000 was lost.

An English-German army

The attempt to split New England from

the other rebellious North American colonies had ended in
total failure.
As this gloomy news enveloped Parliament, it became
increasingly clear that with American military success,
French support of the colonists might quickly expand beyond
the hitherto somewhat furtive supplies of credit and
1 Parl1amenta!'Y History, XIX, 322.

44
materiel.

Rumors circulated in London of the pending French

recognition of American independence.

A full alliance be-

tween the North American rebels and France was viewed in
England as an increasing likelihood which might lead England
into a new war with France.
In the few days between the arrival of the news of
Burgoyne's debacle and the scheduled annual Christmas recess, Lord North's foes in Parliament pursued both issues.
David Hartley, Member from Hull, proposed an immediate cessation of the North American hostilities in order to seek a
reconciliation with the colonists.

To reach this end it

would be necessary, Hartley said,
• • • to bestow upon the colonies an entire freedom
of legislative powers within themselves; hoping
thereby to lay a foundation for a perpetual and indissoluable bond of affection and alliance in every
respect as beneficial to both countries • • • • "2
Hartley's proposals were defeated without a division.
Before Parliament recessed, however, North's foes resumed their attack.

The Opposition renewed its demands for

an inquiry into the events which culminated with Burgoyne's
surrender, the status of Franco-British relations, and combined these efforts into a motion calling for Parliament to
meet the growing crisis by remaining in session and foregoing its customary Christmas recess.3
2 Ibid., p. 560.

3
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Despite warnings of
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the pending Franco-American alliance, Lord North presented
an undisturbed countenance to Commons.

As early as November

20, 1776, Lord Stormont, British Minister to Paris, had
reported to Lord Weymouth,
I am very secretly and, I am afraid, authentically

informed that a treaty or convention is not only
agreed upon, but is actually drawn out article by
article, libelle et paragraphe, were the words my
informer used.4
Nonetheless, Lord North reassured Commons on December
10th in the debate over the adjournment, "The Campaign is
already terminated.

France did not molest us; nor did he

believe either France or Spain had the least intention to
mo1 est us • • • •

,,5

The effort to bring Parliament back

into session in seven days rather than the customary six
week adjournment was initiated by Burke.

His motion failed,

155 to 68, but not before North had promised to present to
Parliament after the Christmas recess conciliatory proposals aimed at restoring peace in the North American colonies.

A similar motion to remain in session over the

Christmas holidays of 1777 was also defeated in the House of
Lords. 6
4
B. F. Stevens, Facsimilies of ManuscriBts in European Archives Relating to America, 1775 to 17 3 (25 v~,
London, 1889-1895), XIV, 1375.

5Parllamentary History, XIX, 591.

6 Ibid.
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Parliament's recess did not deter one of its members,
William Eden, from his work on a plan of reconciliation with
America.

Since Eden was a confidante of North, it is more

than likely his efforts were guided to some extent by North.
With its customary circumspection, Eden and the British Ministry began to try to sound out the American Commissioners
in Paris on their views of acceptable conciliation terms.
Agents of the North Ministry (including Paul Wentworth who
represented Eden) made a series of approaches to both Franklin, now American Commissioner to the Court of Louis XVI at
Versailles, and his fellow commissioner, Silas Deane, the
Connecticut merchant.

But by December 16, 1777, Franklin

had been informed by a representative of Comte

Vergennes~

the French Foreign Minister, that·France was ready to recognize American independence, and to enter into a treaty of
friendship and commerce with the new nation.7
Franklin had suddenly become the focus of both British
and French diplomacy.

It is difficult to determine exactly

all the North agents who contacted Franklin personally,
through intermediaries, or through correspondence.

It would

appear from the references in Franklin's writings that the
main approaches were made by James Hutton, the elderly
leader of the Moravian religious sect in Europe and America;

7Edward E. Hale and Edward E. Hale, Jr., Franklin in
France (2 vols., New York, 1969, 1887), I, 176.
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David Hartley, member of Parliament and persistent advocate
of conciliation; William Johnstone Pulteney, member of Parliament from Shrewsbury; a Mr. Chapman, member of the Irish
Parliament; Benjamin Vaughan, an associate of Lord Shelburne; and the mysterious Charles de Weissensteln.
In addition, the correspondence between King George
III and Lord North identifies Paul Wentworth, a British
agent on the Continent, as another North emissary who sought
to learn American conciliation terms from Franklin in the
December-January, 1777-78 Parliamentary recess.

The King

wrote to Lord North on January 13, 1778:
I have read the very voluminous and undigested
letters from Mr. Wentworth • • • • It also appears
from these letters that Franklin and Deane either
have no power of treating or that they are not
inclined to furnish any lights how an accommodation can be effected, for whilst nothing short of
Independency will be accepted, I do not think there
is a Man either bold or Mad enough to presume to
treat for the Mother Country on such a basis; perhaps the time may come when it will be wise to
abandon all North America but Canada, Nova Scotia
and the Floridas, but then the generality of the
Nation must see it first in that light; but to
treat with Independence can never be possible.8
Who were the authorized and genuine representatives of
the North Ministry?

Who were agents or double agents?

Who

acted out of compassion or goodwill generated by only their
own dedication to restoring peace and harmony within the
British Empire?

It is difficult to sort the authentic agents
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of government from the frauds.

But with the French commit-

ment of December 16, 1777 to American independence and an
alliance, Franklin made the French connection his basic
position.

He responded to all approaches with essentially

the same terms--immediate American independence or the withdrawal of British forces from North America--was the necessary first step to any discussion of conciliation.
Those who appear to have been accredited representatives of North (in addition to Wentworth) were most likely
William Pulteney and David Hartley.

Their contacts with

Franklin may well have contributed to the conciliatory proposals made to Parliament by Lord North, February 19, 1778.
The greatest contribution to this plan, however, came frQm
North's aide, Eden.

During December, 1777 and January, 1778

he had been busily preparing the peace proposal for North's
consideration.

In the process he corresponded with a number

of members of Parliament, and had the aid of SolicitorGeneral Alexander Wedderburn in drafting his measure.9
"A pacific proposition," North wrote to the King on
January 29, 1778,
appears to him (Lord North] necessary both for this
country and America; Ld. North's declaration requires
it; at the same time it may be very disgustful to
the present zealous friends of government. If a
proposal is made it must be a considerable and explicit one and such as bids fair to have some effect

9stevens, Facsimilies of Manuscripts in Euro ean
Archives Relating to America, 1775 to 1783, IV, 34~,348.
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in the Colonies. But what will do there may offend
and fail here • • • • 10
It is almost certain that before North made public his
proposals in Parliament on February 19, 1778, he was fully
aware that the Franco-American Alliance had become fact.
Wentworth in Paris confirmed that the treaty had been
signed. 11

Lord Camden told the House of Lords on February

16, 1778 he had seen correspondence from Franklin that
North's still pending proposals were too late.

He added

that the Franco-American Alliance had already been signed
in Paris. 12
In the face of certain knowledge that American independence had been recognized by England's traditional
enemy, Lord North continued his conciliation plans.

In gen-

eral terms, he proposed "to repeal the Tea Duty, to repeal
the Massachusetts Charter Bill, and to give, by an Act of
Parliament, ample promises to the Commissioners to settle
every other point. 1113

This included renunciation by Parlia-

ment of its right to tax Americans, and the appointment of
Commissioners to treat with Congress, colonies or individuals on further grievances in bringing about reconciliation.
lOcorrespondence of King George III,
11
Ibid., p. 36.
12
Parliamentary History, XIX, 741.

rv, 28.

13Correspondence of King George III, IV, 28.
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The American sine qua non had been achieved with the
signing of the French treaty thereby recognizing American
independence February 6, 1778. 14

But Vergennes insisted on

maintaining secrecy on the treaty while he made his final
efforts to bring Spain in also as a signatory to the
American treaties.

Thus, Franklin continued to play the

role of the reluctant colonial determined upon independence
as a preliminary to any accommodation.
Some have argued that North's conciliatory measures
were designed chiefly to block or delay the Franco-American
rapprochement.

North was aware the agreement between France

and America had been formalized
plans to Parliament.

before he presented his

Even after the French officially noti-

fied England of their recognition·of America on March 1,
1778, North continued his efforts at conciliation. 15 Discussions about conciliation with other Ministers and its
review with the King indicate it was not considered some
minor diplomatic ploy.
Likewise the sincerity of Franklin in conciliation
negotiations in the spring of 1778 has been questioned.

Did

he encourage the English approaches to maintain a delicate
pressure upon the French during a critical period of the

14
1'

Samuel F. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American

Revolution (Bloomington, Indiana, ~1957J

15

1935)

p.

Correspondence of King George III, IV, 77.
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treaty negotiations with France?

That same pressure after

the treaty signing could also have been the means to assure
that the French would observe their treaty obligations.

It

is worth noting that Franklin consistently sought from Great
Britain only that which France had already granted--recognition of American independence.

There seems every indication

that Franklin's actions were steadfastly directed toward
American independence.
Writing to Hartley on February 26, 1778, Franklin repeated the essential ingredients of the accommodation the
North Ministry was seeking, that is, independence or the
withdrawal of British forces in North America.

He added,

Seriously, on further thoughts, I am of the opinion
that, if wise and honest men, such as Sir George
Savile, the Bishop of Asaph~ and yourself were to come
over here immediately with powers to treat, you might
not only obtain peace with America, but prevent a war
with France.16
Lord North's proposal for an American Peace Commission
received the same critical scrutiny in Parliament it would
undergo at a later date in America.

Rumors of the Franco-

American treaty continued, but were still denied officially
by the Ministry in Parliament.

The strongest arguments in

support of the conciliation measures were those which
repeated the truisms of the Anglo-American relationships in
which many members of Parliament still believed.

"To Great

16 smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, VII, 109.

52
Britain they (the colonies] are united by religion, government, laws, language, habits, affection and relation," Sir
Grey Cooper, a North supporter and advocate of the plan,
told the House of Commons on March 2, 1778 during the debate
on the conciliation question. 1 7
Lord Shelburne opposed the North plan as falling short
of what the colonies would demand.

Still, he warned, the

shock of separation to Great Britain would be drastic.

He

voiced the commonly held belief that, " •• • the sun of
Great Britain is set, and we shall no longer be a powerful
or respectable people, the moment the independency of
America is agreed to by our government. 1118
Another viewpoint was that of John Wilkes, the controversial radical member of Commons·representing a London
district.

"The.Conciliatory bills," he declared in Com-

mons, "are in my opinion more calculated for this country
than America.

They appear only meant to keep the minds of
the people quiet here • • • • 111 9
The Earl of Abingdon's protest against the American
Conciliatory Bills pointed out some of the major deficiencies. in North's proposals.

First, that Parliament in re-

nouncing taxation of the colonies could provide no guarantee
1 7Parliamentary History, XIX, 791.

18

Ibid., p. 850.

19 Ibid., p. 806.
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that a future Parliament might not reinstate that taxation.
Second, how could Parliament suspend a right that many members as well as Americans argued was not possessed by Parliament in the first instance?

Third, Congress would be

compelled to negotiate with the English peace commissioners
without knowing what would be ultimately accepted by Parliament. 20
Approval by Parliament of Lord North's American Peace
Commission did not deter either North's official agents or
those who thought they acted on England's behalf from pursuing matters with Franklin.

Franklin summed up his view

of the North plan in a letter to Gerard Rayneval in the
French Foreign Ministry.
He will show you the Propositions. They would probably have been accepted, if they had been made two
years ago. I have answered they come too late; And
that every Kind of Acknowledgement of the Government
of Great Britain, how small soever, is now become
impracticable.21
The long-rumored Franco-American treaty was finally
confirmed by Lord North in Commons on March 17, 1778.

Con-

ciliation with America now gained a new force generated by
the fear of war with France.

Writing to the King, March

25th, North pointed out,
• • • although the offence received from France is
great He [Lord North) owns that he should be glad if
an accommodation with America would prevent for the
20 Ib1d., p. 867.
21 smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, VII, 128.
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present moment a war with France, as he thinks that
Great Britain will suffer more ln the war, than her
enemies, He does not mean, by defeats, but by an
enormous expense, which will ruin her, and will not
in any degree be repaid by the most brilliant victories. 22
It was under these circumstances that William Pulteney
was dispatched to Paris on March 29, 1778 to meet with
Franklin and seek his agreement to the North plan of conciliation.

Franklin merely repeated to Pulteney that the

propositions of 1778 were two years too late.

Independence

or the withdrawal of British forces in North America
remained the rock bottom conditions for negotiation.
Pulteney's own analysis of his mission and the prospects for reconciliation appeared in a pamphlet published
later in 1778 under the title, Thoughts on the Present State
of Affairs with America and the Means of Conciliation.
Pulteney reviewed the American question from its

emergenc~

as a dispute over taxation, and concluded
• • • the Americans had no option but either to submit as a conquered people . . • or to declare themselves independent, in order to establish some
regular form of government amongst themselves, and
to entitle them to treat for assistance with other
powers.23
To resolve England's dilemma, Pulteney leaned heavily
on Lord North's proposals with some additional concessions.
22

77.

Fortescue, Correspondence of King George III, IV,

2 3William Pulteney, Thoughts on the Present State of
Affairs with America and the Means of_Conc~liation (London,

1778),

p.

41.
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He would have eliminated permanently any question of current
or future British taxation in the American colonies, and
made voluntary all American contributions to Empire administration.

All colonial charters would have been restored and

remained unchanged except by petition from the colonists.
Pulteney also went beyond North's plan by urging the repeal
of the

Q~ebec

Act, and promising the establishment in Canada

of a form of government modeled on the British constitution.
Pulteney was frankly fearful of the long-range results of
the Franco-American alliance, the ultimate military and
economic strength of an independent America, and especially
the role it might play in international relations as a
protege of France. 24
"The two countries (England and America]," he
pleaded,
are peculiarly fitted to contribute to each others
prosperity; and if anything is likely to prolong, to
ages too remote for probable conjecture, the freedom
and prosperity of this Kingdom, I conceive it would
be, the connection which may now be formed, with
British America.25
Perhaps the strangest of all the agents who sought to
contact Franklin in Paris for the purpose of reconciliation
was Charles de Weissenstein.

His letter to Franklin was

purportedly posted from Brussels, June 16, 1778 and delivered
surreptiously.

24Ibid.,

The basis for the secret negotiations which

45 , 54 , 55 • ..
2 5Ibid., p. 54.
PP·

56
de Weissenstein proposed were essentially Lord North's propositions.

Once terms had been agreed upon, de Weissenstein

suggested they could be confirmed by an Act of Parliament.
There was no doubt in Franklin's mind that the
de Weissenstein initiative originated either with King
George III or with one of his Ministers.

The clearest evi-

dence of this origin is that portion of the de Weissenstein
letter which suggested,
• • • the following persons shall have offices, or pensions for life, at their option, according to the sums
opposite their respective names: -Messers. Adams,
Hancock,
Washington,
Franklin,
&c, &c, &c
In case his Majesty or his successors shall ever
create American peers, then these persons, or their
descendants, shall be amongst the first so created, if
they choose it. Mr. Washington to have immediately a
brevet of Lieutenant General~ and all the honors and
precedences thereto • • • • 2°
Franklin was directed to send his response by messenger to Notre Dame at an appointed day and time.

The mes-

senger was to wait for the drop of a crumpled paper to the
floor of the Cathedral to signal his readiness to receive
the response.

Franklin's answer, flatly rejecting the pro-

positions and the mode of negotiation, was prepared but
probably never delivered since the de Weissenstein letter
26 Hale and Hale, Jr., Franklin in France, I, 239.

57
and the response were found together in the French archives.
According to Edward Hale in Franklin in France,
On the day and hour appointed at Notre Dame, an
Irishman named "Col. Fitzsomething" appeared at the
place appointed and remained for two hours tracked
all the time by police, who had been directed by
Vergennes to keep an eye upon him.27
Meanwhile in London the North Administration slowly
gathered the individuals who were to make up the American
Peace Commission.

As its head, the King appointed Frederick

Howard, Earl of Carlisle, whose name would forever be assoelated with the reconciliation efforts.

Carlisle had a

reputation as an ambitious but ineffective politician with a
flair for high living.

Eden, architect of the Peace Comis-

sion and close to Lord North, was also selected.
Carlisle was the Commission's chief,

Ede~

Although

virtually directed

affairs because of his association with North.

Sir Henry

Clinton, commander-in-chief of British Forces in America,
was also appointed to the Commission, but remained entirely
inactive so far as its peace-making activities were concerned.

The fourth commissioner named was Richard Jackson,

member of Parliament from New Romney.

When Jackson

expressed reluctance over participating, and indicated he
favored an immediate grant of independence for America, he
was quietly dropped.

He was replaced by Commodore George
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Johnstone, also a member of Parliament and a one-time Governor of Georgia.
Instructions to the Commissioners for achieving reconciliation were detailed and voluminous.

In addition to the

concessions already made by Parliament in suspending or
repealing existing acts, the Commissioners were authorized
to promise:
The claim of independence to be admitted during the
time of the treaty and for the purpose of the treaty.
British protection of American commerce as soon as
peace was established.
No taxation of the colonies by Parliament.
Voluntary contributions for Empire administration and
defense.
No standing army in America in peace time if provincial forces were organized.
No alteration of colonial charters except by colonial
consent.
Popular election of Governors with the King's approval.
Election of delegates to Congress under the Articles
of Confederation to continue, but no infringement of the
sovereignity of Great Britain.
Unqualified pardon of all persons.
Admiralty Courts to be restrained in their operation.
If repeal of the Declaratory Act was proposed, a
declaration on the respective rights of Great Britain
and America should be framed upon the close of the whole
treaty.
Abolition

or

quitrents and claims ror arrears.

Loyalist property must be restored to its owners.
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Colonial obligations prior to August, 1775 must be
paid.
England would not redeem colonial paper money nor
accept responsibility for debts incurred by the colo·nies in the course of the rebellion.28
No renunciation of the Declaration of Independence was
spelled out as had been the case in the conciliation plan of

1776.

However, it was expected that there was to be a tacit

American acceptance of this when agreement had been reached
on all the remaining terms of peace.
Certainly the North Administration had moved a great
distance from its position at the time of the Howe Peace
Commission of 1776.

Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga and

the possibility of French intervention had placed colonial
problems in a vastly different perspective.

Taxation of the

colonies was forthrightly abandoned in favor of a voluntary
plan.

Legislative supremacy was no longer the exclusive

prer..ogative of Parliament, but to be shared in somewhat
undefined terms with Congress and the colonies if one presumes Parliament would have ratified the extreme limits of
the Carlisle Commission's instructions.

While the question

of American representation in Parliament was raised in the
instructions, the Commissioners were directed to refer proposals on this matter to the Ministry before taking any
steps to confer this privilege on Americans.

In all, the

28 Eric Robson, The American Revolution in its Political and Military Aspects (New York, 1966) p. 197; Brown,
Empire or Independence, pp. 250-251.
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Commissioners carried an attractive package of peace proposals that went far toward recognizing Congress as an independent power at least for the purposes of negotiating a
treaty and re-establishing the peace.

It was responsive to

what had been the chief colonial grievances prior to 1776.
It was intended that the basis of any treaty rest on restoring conditions as they existed in 1763, now seen as a happy
era that had ended the Anglo-French rivalry in North America
and before the recent colonial quarrels had arisen.
Great Britain was offering to America what later generations would refer to as virtual dominion status.

In the

opinion of William Knox, a key figure at the Board of Trade
where he served so long,
. • • if the colonies had accepted the offers the
Commissioners were impowered to make, the people
then would have had all the advantages of British
subjects without any share of the burdens of
Empire • • • • 29
When the proposals reached America on April 14, 1778
well ahead of the Commissioners, they were forwarded to
General Washington by Royal Governor Tryon of New York.
Washington passed them on to Congress with a suggestion they
be given wide distribution so long as Congress added its
appropriate comments on the proposals.

Washington logically

suspected some major diplomatic event in Europe had brought
about the new British conc111at1on proposals.
2 9Ibid., p. 197, as quoted by Robson.

Congress
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agreed with Washington'a analysis, and on April 22, 1778
voted to reject the North conciliation plan as insincere and
30
divisive.
It refused to enter into any negotiations until
England either acknowledged American independence or withdrew its forces from the colonies.

Meanwhile, Congress

urged publication of the proposals along with its comments
in colonial newspapers.

The Congressional comment virtually

paralleled that already made in Parliament as the conciliation proposals were debated.
Whether Congress had acted wisely in an immediate
refusal to consider Great Britain's offer to retreat from
its long-held positions on many imperial questions and to
negotiate a new relationship was discussed by the general
public only briefly.

On May 2, 1778 Silas Deane reached

York, Pennsylvania, the temporary seat of Congress, bearing
the French treaties recognizing American independence.

The

treaties were swiftly ratified by a hastily reassembled
Congress.
Thus, when the American Peace Commissioners reached
Philadelphia on June 6, 1778 nearly all likelihood that
their mission might enjoy any success had already been
destroyed.

They found Americans buoyed not only by the

military success of Saratoga, but reassured in the new-found
30Journals of the Continental Congress (39 vols.,
Washington, D.C., 1908), X, 380.

62
security of the Franco-American Alliance.

To the further

dismay of the Commissioners, on their arrival in Philadelphia they discovered the British forces about to evacuate
the colonial capitol, and under orders to detach a large
part of the existing British forces in North America for an
expedition to the French West Indies.3 1 Events, unfavorable
at the outset for England, had continued to run against the
cause of conciliation.
The Commissioners wrote to the President of Congress
on June 9th, declaring their authority to negotiate peace
terms and outlining the basis upon which their instructions
rested for reaching a peaceful settlement of Anglo-American
differences.

The Congressional response on June 17, 1778

was a reiteration of the earlier decision on April 23rd:
acknowledgement of American independence or withdrawal of
British forces were pre-conditions before any negotiations
could be considered.3 2 Commodore Johnstone, one of the
Peace Commissioners, thereupon launched a personal campaign
of letter writing to colonial leaders.

The letters promised

high honors and rewards to those who would help in bringing
about conciliation.

The recipients generally interpreted

Commodore Johnstone's letters as clumsy attempts at bribery.

31

.

Robson, The American Revolution in its Political
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32Journals of the Continental Congress, XI, 614.
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The letters were turned over to Congress and many ultimately
published.33
On July 11th the Commissioners wrote again to Congress, which declined to answer a letter inquiring by what
authority Congress made treaties with foreign powers.

The

Commissioners issued two more despairing manifestos proclaiming their peaceful purposes and their desire for reconciliation.

The first was published on August 26, 1778 and

the second on October 3rd.

Neither produced even a modicum

of favorable public or press sentiment toward conciliation.34
Nor did Congress even feel it necessary to acknowledge the
proclamations.

The discouraged Commissioners set sail for

England in November, 1778, their mission a complete failure.
William Eden, one of the Peace Commissioners, reviewed
the Commission's work in a pamphlet published in 1779.

With

considerable accuracy he identified France as the principal
cause of his failure in America.

"I am • • • ,"he wrote,

• • • fully satisfied that if France had not thrown
away the scabbard in the beginning of last year,
your Lordship (the Earl of Carlisle] would have had
the honour of announcing to this country the recovery of her colonies •
.35
33Robson, The American Revolution in its Political and
Military Aspects, p. 203.
34 Ib1d., p. 205.
35william Eden, Four Letters to the Earl of Carlisle
from William Eden, Esq:-\London, 1779) p. 40.
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Eden saw the conflict in America not as a colonial
struggle for independence but rather an imperial rivalry
over colonies between Great Britain, France and Spain.

The

critical question for Britain's foremost advocate of conciliation was
• • . whether we shall be deprived of our dependencies, be stript of our maritime power, become total
and immediate bankrupts to all the world and hold a
crippled trade and commerce hereafter at the goodwill and compassion of the House of Bourbon.36
Eden also pointed out, "The original object of this war is
the recovery of our Colonies (and we should never lose sight
of that object)."

He concluded, ". . . but our first pur-

pose at present is to establish our superiority at sea
against France and Spain."37
From December, 1777 through the fall of 1778 the initlative for conciliation had been assumed logically and
almost solely by Great Britain.

She made the concessions,

she proposed the terms which even her own Parliament might
have found it difficult to ratify and she undertook to bring
the Americans to the conference table either in Paris or in
America.

All of her efforts at conciliation failed.

Why?

First, and most obviously, American military strength
and American diplomacy were in the ascendancy.

Lord Jeffrey

Amherst, victor in America in the French and Indian War, was

36 Ibid., p. 48.

37 Ibid., p. 57.

65
asked for his advice on future British strategy in the dark
days of December, 1777.

He coolly informed the King it

would require another army of at least 40,000 men to make up
for the losses at Saratoga and conquer America.38

Such an

undertaking was beyond the logistic and support capabilities of Great Britain even if the American rebels were her
only concern, which was not the case.

French intervention

had to be considered a highly probable development; Spain,
too, might play a role.

The Franco-American Alliance only

worsened an already desperate situation.
Little wonder Lord North wrote on March 25, 1778 to
the King in a gloomy forecast:
Lord North begs leave to trouble his majesty for a
moment on a disagreeable subject in which he is bound
to speak truth, the bad situation of affairs will
with great appearance of reason be attributed to the
obstinate perseverance in the American War. There is
therefore no probability that the present Ministers
can continue many weeks longer . . • • In short,
peace with America, and a change in the Ministry are
the only steps which can save this country.39
The motivation for conciliation and peace were primarily British and hence the initiatives had to come from
that source.

But for whatever reason, the Ministry proved

incapable of laying out a coherent master plan and following
it.

Its simultaneous multiple policies could only lead--as

they did--to charges of insincerity and divisiveness.

This

38Fortescue, Correspondence of King George III, IV, 15.
39 Ibid., p. 78.
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at a time when credibility was an attribute that British
diplomacy desperately needed.

A case in point was the

multiple efforts of British representatives to bring about
conciliation negotiations in Paris.

Who spoke for the King?

Paul Wentworth, James Hutton, David Hartley, William
Pulteney or Charles de Weissenstein?

The outward appear-

ances of these efforts were trickery and deceit.
It might be argued that Franklin encouraged this situation in order to keep the French responsive to American
financial and military needs.

However, it is difficult to

believe that if Franklin had perceived a genuine British
willingness to negotiate on the basis of independence he
would not have seized it quickly.

American success was

never such a sure thing that a legitimate opportunity could
be ignored.
North's conciliatory proposals which evolved into the
Carlisle Commission could have been--as some have suggested
--simply a last ditch effort at blocking the Franco-American
Alliance.

The facts to support this viewpoint are almost

totally absent.

If this were the case, then the superb

British intelligence system failed Lord North miserably.
The Franco-American Alliance was agreed upon and signed
before Lord North offered his conciliation plan in Parliament on February

17, 1778.

"Within forty-two hours after

the signature of the treaties of February 6, 1778, Bancroft
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got copies of them to Whitehall • • • ,"

40

and North must

have been aware of the Franco-American Alliance well before
his conciliation terms reached Parliament.

It is another

tribute to Dr. Edward Bancroft, secretary to the American
Commissioners, and known to be one of North's intelligence
sources in Paris.
It seems far more logical in the context of North's
own concerns for the future, his willingness to turn over
the leadership to Lord Chatham and the gloomy military outlook seen by Lord Amherst that the conciliation effort was
genuine.

From the British viewpoint it offered an escape

from the quicksand of an increasingly costly American War
while faced with a new French threat.
Within the political and diplomatic ramifications of
the conciliation of 1778 and the Carlisle Commission can be
identified some of the critical elements in the great reconciliation effort by Great Britain in 1782.

Among them were

the British perspective of the Anglo-American bonds of language, government, culture, religion and shared traditions.
Another was the unreasoned fear of the economic consequences
to Great Britain from the loss of its colonies.

England's

growing diplomatic isolation in Europe was still another
factor.

The ferment of domestic political reform contrib-

uted its uncertainty, too.

And compounded with these

40 Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution,

p. 66.
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elements was the conservative conviction that the system of
mercantilism which had brought England to its greatest hour
of triumph in 1763 still remained the touchstone of future
economic security.

Each had helped to shape the failure of

conciliation in the crisis of 1777-78 and each would play a
role in the final treaty of peace between America and Great
Britain.

CHAPTER IV
THE LAST CAMPAIGN
Militarily and more important, diplomatically, the
year 1778 marked a watershed in the events of the American
War.

With the revelation of the long expected Franco-

American alliance in March, the war which had begun as a
North American colonial rebellion against imperial restraints became international in scope.

France openly

entered the struggle in March, 1778 as an ally of the colSpain followed France's lead in April, 1779.

onies.

Great

Britain declared war on the Netherlands in December, 1780,
to end that nation's role as a neutral supplier of the
rebels.

The involvement of the world's foremost colonial

powers--England, Spain, France and Holland--cast the shadow
of war across four continents.

The hazard of conflict

existed in Europe, North America and the Caribbean Islands,
Africa and the Asian sub-continent, India.
Before 1775 those in England and America who aimed at
a middle way short of war and separation identified their
goals and themselves with something they called the English
constitution.

The ties between colonies and Great Britain

still seemed strong enough to bind together those who shared
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ancient political traditions, a common language and allegiance to the throne of Great Britain.

When war came in

1775 men of goodwill on both sides of the Atlantic still
pursued the will-o'-the-wisp of reconciliation and reunion
through direct appeal and negotiation.

Now, in 1778, how-

ever, the efforts to end the American conflict moved away
from the traditional Anglo-American channels into the labyrinths of international diplomacy.

The war's expansion

after 1778 entangled the war aims of the North American colonies for independence with the international rivalries of
the European powers.

Conciliation no longer was only the

concern of London and the colonies; it became the interest
of diplomats in Madrid, Paris, St. Petersburg and Vienna
as well.
Spain, an incongruous ally to a colonial rebellion,
was the origin of the first mediation effort in 1779.

The

Spanish ultimatum to Great Britain, offering its good
offices to mediate the differences between Great Britain and
its colonies, as an alternative to Spanish involvement, was
designed, of course, to produce rejection by the British. 1
The terms outlined by Spain are worth noting since they remained essentially the basis of all succeeding mediation
initiatives over the next two years.

The proposed founda-

tions for the mediation were de facto recognition of
1

p. 83.
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American independence by Great Britain during the negotiations and a long term truce uti
cease fire.

possidet~

or stand still

For its good offices in this mediation, Spain

would be pleased to accept Fortress Gibraltar from a grate2
ful Britain.
Britain's flat refusal to consider such a bargain
offered Spain the opportunity to declare it had been forced
into the conflict by Britain's action.

The already planned

French-Spanish Armada against England sailed to its summer
rendezvous with futility, but not before bringing home to
Britons the frightening realization of their vulnerability
in fighting a naval war both in North America and Europe.
The success of the combined French and Spanish fleets in
eluding the British fleet off Plymouth as well as the rumors
of French and Spanish landings in England during the summer
of 1779, were to have an ultimate impact on the shape of
English diplomacy.3
It was Spain again which initiated the possibilities
of ending the now international war and resolving the
American problem through mediation in 1780.

Spain's reward

for bringing to a close what more and more appeared that
year to be a stalemated war in both Europe and America was
naturally Gibraltar.
2

England, despite its success in

Ibid., p. 84.

3Morr1s, The Peacemakers, pp. 37-40.
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capturing Charleston, South Carolina, in May, 1780 was
interested in ending an increasingly heavy drain on its resources and manpower--if it could be done without loss to
the Empire.

It did not contemplate a gift of the stature

and significance of Gibraltar to Spain or independence for
America.
Thus came about the diplomatic mission of Richard
Cumberlund, playwright and government functionary, and
Thomas Hussey, Irish priest, to Spain as agents of Lord
Germain, the American Secretary.

Spain's proposal for re-

solving the American war was close to its earlier ultimatum
to Great Britain.

That is, a long-term truce uti possidetis

accompanied by direct negotiations between England and its
colonies at the European peace conference.

The basis for

the negotiations as outlined were approximately those of
the Carlisle Commission proposals or in today's terms,
dominion status.

Britain's outright refusal to consider

cession of Gibraltar to Spain for equivalents of any sort
brought the preliminary discussions to a halt. 4
At the Court of America's first European ally, France,
there were also efforts at finding peace in 1780.

At the

center of the intrigue was the Director General of Finances,
Jacques Necker.

Necker used his role as the financial head

4Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution,
pp. 105-106.
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of the French government to urge Comte Maurepas, the French
premier, toward a negotiated peace with England, by abandoning his commitments to America in the interest of rescuing
France from an increasingly desperate financial situation.
Indirect communication between Necker and North via the
London banker, Thomas Walpole, continued into October.
Then, King George III put a finish to further encouragement
of the incipient negotiations by refusing to participate
"whilst the House of Bourbon made American independency an
article of their propositions

II

5

Another Necker intrigue to remove France from the war
via a truce and some sort of division of America was also in
operation in other channels during the summer of 1780.

The

English envoy to Sardinia, Viscount Mountstuart, met his onetime tutor, Paul-Henri Mallet, while vacationing from his
post in Turin at Geneva.

Mallet had been prepared for his

contact by a series of meetings in Paris with Necker.

Al-

though the proposed peace terms were never specified in
detail by Necker, it was suggested that one province in
America might be granted its independence while the remainder of the colonies returned to their former relationship to
Great Britain.

Mountstuart passed along these and other

hirits of French desires to end the war to Lord Hillsborough,

5Morr1s, The Peacemakers, p. 97.
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the foreign minister, in London.

It was the King in Novem-

ber, 1780 who again halted possible peace negotiations with
a flat refusal to negotiate with France so long as that
nation aided the former colonies in their rebellion. 6
These failures did not discourage other European
nations from pursuing mediation of what was an international
war inextricably tangled with Anglo-American differences.
Russia launched its mediation effort in December, 1780
presenting proposals to the three European belligerents,
France, England and Spain.

In the months that followed each

of the three nations maneuvered to shape the peace proposal
to its own ends or to delay action when that was in its
interest.

By May, 1781 the Russian mediation suggestion had

been re-shaped into a new plan transmitted to the three
European belligerents.

It was now a co-mediation by

Catherine, Empress of Russia and Joseph, the Emperor of
Austria.

The proposal called for a peace congress in Vienna

with direct but separate negotiations between England and
America in the same city.

However, the participation of

Austria and Russia or the belligerents in the Anglo-American
discussions was only to take place when requested.

In addi-

tion, the separate settlement between Great Britain and its
colonies would not be valid unless it was signed in conjunction with a peace treaty among the European powers at war.

6

Ibid., p. 103.
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Finally, there was to be a general armistice for a year to
enable the congress to meet in Vienna.7
The co-mediation collapsed in June, 1781 with Britain 1 s flat refusal to negotiate with its colonies under the
auspices of an international peace conference.

"The media-

tors were reminded of· the King's 'immutable resolution' not
to permit any interference by foreign powers with his rebellious subjects. 118 The French, stiffened by John Adams'
refusal to accept any other role at Vienna than that of a
sovereign, independent nation, likewise declined the comediation.

The Spanish were also disinterested--there was

no stipulation concerning the cession of

Gibraltar~

If America's allies demonstrated less than an eagerness to pursue the war at all costs in 1780 and 1781 by
their involvement in a series of abortive peace efforts, so
too did England suffer from the same malaise.

The failure

to achieve a decisive victory in America and the growing
expense of a global war produced disaffection with the idea
of a never-popular conquest of the colonies.

David Hartley

estimated the military and naval expenses of five years
(1775-1780) of war in America

at~71,875,ooo. 9

Hartley

7Ibid., pp. 173-174.

8 Ibid.,
.
p. 185.
9David Hartley, An Address to the Committee of the
County of Yol"k on the State of' Public Affairs (London, 1781)
p.

6.
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declared Britons had suffered losses of another

~30,000,000

through increased taxes, the fall in stock prices and the
destruction of the colonial trade as well as merchant marine
losses to privateers.
Piled atop the burdens of the American War for Great
Britain, was a disastrous situation in Ireland, where trade
restrictions were reducing the population to starvation.
The effectiveness of the North Ministry in prosecuting the
American war was sharply criticized both in and out of Parliament.

The system of pensions, sinecures, fees and com-

missions by which those who purchased or were given government posts and then enriched themselves came under the
fiercest attack.

Associations of freeholders were formed

throughout England and Scotland to bring before Parliament
a barrage of petitions demanding financial and electoral
reforms.

The Association movement brought together a

variety of individuals seeking redress over grievances, all
of which seemed to have been exacerbated by the American
War and the accompanying international conflict in which
Britain found herself entangled.
David Hartley, a member of Parliament from Hull, and
a consistent spokesman for conciliation with America, expressed many of the fears Britons felt after five years of
unsuccessful war.

Hartley, speaking before the Committee of

the County of York, the Association unit in that locality,
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in January, 1781, looked back to the events of 1780.

He

outlined the reasons for unrest in England--corruption in
government, high taxes, the stalemated American War,
England's diplomatic isolation and his perception of the
growing threats to England's economy.
"But, believe me," Hartley told his York listeners,
the greatest of all evils now, and that which requires instant remedy, is the American war: A war
which has had its rise in pride and now derives its
nourishment from corruption; a war which, from contracts, perquisites, and exorbitant emoluments, may,
perhaps, find advocates both in parliament and out
of it; but which, I trust, will receive every constitutional opposition from the justice and disinterested wisdom of the county of York and other
associated counties. If some stop be not put to the
American war, according to the unanimous resolution
of the county of York, all your views of public reformat ion will come too late; you will, alas! have
no country to save.10
Hartley pointed out that ending the American War was
the key to England's problems.

Resolutions demanding Par-

liament to act toward this end had already been endorsed by
the County of York Association meeting on March 28, 1780,
and by the County of Cambridge Association on April 10,
11
The American War as Hartley and others saw it in
1780.
the fifth year of conflict had clearly become a no-win
situation for Great Britain.

Even a decisive British vie-

tory and an America forced into submission to British rule
held no charms for Hartley.
10
11

Ibid., p. 44.
Ibid., p. 25.
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• • • it would only be the commencement of our
difficulties. The whole force of this country
would then be bound down to America for ever. To
maintain the conquest of such a country in reluctant
subjection, 3000 miles distant, and 1500 miles in
its own extent, would require, I believe I might
venture to say, the whole force of Europe; but would
certainly exceed the extremest powers of Great
Britain. In such a case the House of Bourbon would
have completely gained their end . . . but if they
could once see the whole force of Great Britain
bound down and fixt to the continent of America
• • • • A new war would emerge upon us even out of
our supposed victories . • • and perhaps brought
home with terror and dismay to our own defenceless
gates.12
For the sake of argument Hartley examined the possibility of a voluntary surrender and submission to British
rule by the rebellious colonies, a development he saw as
highly unlikely.

Even this possibility left England

threatened with the likelihood of a future test of strength
with either Spain or France or both Joined in alliance with
the restive Americans.

Indeed, as Hartley looked at

England's position at the beginning of 1781 the view was
gloomy.
We have not a single ally in the whole world, and
every man's hand is lifted up against us. A little
cloud arose in the West, at first no bigger than a
man's hand, it has already cast its gloom over the
horizon of our glory, it is spreading over our heads
with darkness and dismay • • • • 13
The Hartley solution was
That some kind of conciliation must take place at
some period or other is most certain, because war
12 Ibid., p. 32.
l3Ibid., p. 45.
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cannot be eternal. But for the terms, I fear, we
cannot expect them now to be such as those which
have been formerly offered to this country by the
unanimous petitions of America, and . . . rejected
with disdain. The only rule which we have hitherto
seemed to follow, has been to refuse the terms which
might have been had at each particular time till it
become too late, and then to contemplate the effects
of our folly and passion with regret . . • . I believe that the wish to see America released from
their engagements with France, and to re-unite that
country in friendship and affection with ourselves,
is much closer to the heart of the people of Great
Britain, than the desire of recovering any reluctant
dependance from them hereafter. 14
The stumbling block to conciliation that Hartley so
deeply desired in order to save England from domestic travail and diplomatic hazards was that dreadful word "independence."

He wished it " • • • could be removed, or even

tacitly dispensed with." 1 5

But the hard facts remained for

Hartley and for the Ministry to grapple with in the turmoil
of 1780.

"Perhaps," Hartley suggested,

the simple concession of independence to America, an
act of generosity and free grace, at the period of
their approaching maturity, and flowing from ourselves, might not have met with much reluctance in a
wise, a liberal and a magnanimous people; it might at
least, have rescued the honour of this country in the
present fatal contest. But our Ministers have cut
off this retreat from us, and that concession which
might have been an act of choice, their conduct has
rendered an action of compulsion.16

14

Ib1d., pp. 36-37.

l5Ib1d., p. 37.

16

Ibid., p. 41.
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Even so, Hartley as a long-time advocate of conciliation and reunion came to the conclusion that
• • • the only way, therefore, to defeat the effect
of the French alliance with America, and "to accomplish a reunion with that country upon just, honourable and beneficial terms" is to proceed henceforward with sincerity, and conciliatory measures
toward America • . • . 17
Hartley as an M.P. from 1774 to 1780 earned a reputation among his fellow members as a dull, verbose speaker.
"Wraxall says, 'His rising always operated like a dinner
bell. 11118 Nonetheless his perception of the Ministry's predicament was incisive.

The volatile mixture of domestic

discontent, the American war and the ominous isolation of
England in European affairs had bolled over in Parliament
early in 1780 in Opposition attacks on the Ministry.

These

reached their peak in John Dunning's motion "That it is the
opinion of this committee that the influence of the Crown
has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished. 111 9
The King's efforts to dump Lord North as his First Minister
and build a new Ministry including some of the Opposition
met with rejection.

The Opposition, headed by Lord Rocking-

ham wanted a complete change in men and policies, not a token role in a coalition Ministry.

As Hartley and others saw

1 7rbid., p. 43.
18Leslie Stephens and Sidney Lee, eds., The Dictionary
of National Biography (22 vols. London 1950 1885).IX, 68.

19

.
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it, the Ministry had led the nation into a quagmire from
which there was no escape.
The spark which ignited the frustrations into a violent explosion was an inoffensive measure intended to relax
the anti-Catholic strictures of English law.

Hopefully, its

passage would earn support of the war against Spain and
France from English Catholics and discourage immigration to
America of Irish tenant farmers.

The law had passed both

Houses of Parliament without a division.

But opposition

fanned by Protestant clergymen and a member of the House of
Lords, George Gordon, resulted in demands for the law's
repeal.

Riots in Scotland against Catholic residences and

chapels broke out.

Gordon, as President of the Protestant

Association of England, organized a London mass meeting of
his supporters for June 2, 1780 to deliver a petition of
repeal to the House of Commons.

More than 60,000 joined

Lord Gordon in marching on Parliament, and the mob quickly
got out of hand.

For the next eight days London was ter-

rorized as gangs attacked Catholic homes and chapels, suspected supporters of the bill granting Catholics more
freedom and anyone who opposed their looting and burning.
Prisons were thrown open and destroyed and the Bank of
England attacked before troops finally brought the riots to
an end.

Casualties amounted to about 800, and property

damage ran in the hundreds of thousands of pounds. 20
20

Ibid., pp. 78-83.
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The shock of the Lord Gordon riots and the suspicion
that they had been instigated either by the Americans or the
French and Spanish produced an outpouring of support for the
threatened Ministry.

In its aftermath came the news of the

surrender of American forces besieged at Charleston.

A

swift call for a general election followed, and the North
Ministry emerged with a slight majority in the House of Commons.

For both King George III and Lord North, the election

appeared to support their views that the war in America must
be pursued to a successful conclusion. 21 This in turn contributed to the rejection of French and Spanish peace overtures and to the rejection of the efforts of Austria and
Russia to re-establish a peace in Europe and America through
their co-mediation at a Vienna peace congress.
But even those who supported the North Ministry in its
prosecution of the American war to a victorious end anticipated some form of reconciliation before reunion.

Joseph

Galloway had been forced to leave Philadelphia when British
forces evacuated that city in 1778.
his thoughts turned to

mea~s

Now in London in 178q

of successfully bringing the

war to an end and re-establishing the relationship between
Great Britain and America on a new basis.
A host of reasons pushed Galloway to his belief" • • •
that this is a critical moment which Government ought to

21

Ibid., p.

87.
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embrace for establishing that system of polity in the colonies which will hereafter secure them to Great Britain. 1122
Galloway was confident that the loyalists in America and
those Americans who had taken neither side in the conflict
were ready to entertain new proposals for reunion.

The

American government under Congress was, in his opinion, a
patchwork of failures.
It is confidently asserted by Gentlemen(e) whose
long residence in America has afforded them every
means of information, and whose veracity stands unimpeached, that not one fifth part of the people of
America has at any period, supported from choice the
American rebellion.23
Galloway also pointed out that "Seven thousand provincials
are actually serving in our Army. 1124 Americans, he said,
had seen
• • • the contempt with which every petition had
been received, and every remonstrance rejected; and
looked forward to the time, when under the administration of men in whom they could confide, and upon
the adoption of measures they might have seen equitable, the Americans would revoke this declaration.25
There was every good reason from Galloway's standpoint
for reunion and an accommodation of American grievances by
Great Britain.

The value of the American colonial trade to

22 Joseph Galloway, Historical and Political Reflections on the Rise and Progress of the American Rebellion
London, 1780) p. 116.
2 3Joseph Galloway, Considerations Upon the American
Enquir~ (London, 1779) p. 1 .
24 Ibid., p. 15.
2 5Ibid., p. 8.
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Great Britain, the dangers of a continuation of the FrancoAmerican alliance to Great Britain, the possibility of the
loss of other British colonies in North America--Canada, the
West Indies and the Bahamas and finally the importance of
America's naval stores as a bulwark of Great Britain's seapower were all solid reasons in Galloway's eyes for the
Ministry to take the initiative in seeking reconciliation.
Galloway admitted the earlier reconciliation attempts
had failed •
• • • our failure hitherto has been owing to very
gross mismanagement; and that though from their public and formal acts it may appear otherwise, yet the
people of America are favourable and friendly to our
cause; and there is every reason to hope for future
success from wise and vigorous measures.26
Whatever may have been the reasons that no adequate
·propositions, no terms which .could lead to a more constitutional union between the countries, have been
settled in British councils, and tendered to the
Americans it is certainly high time, after a four
years military contest, that it should be done.27
Despite the appeals of men like Galloway and Hartley,
British policy turned its back on conciliation as a domestic
program.

Diplomatically, Britain also rejected the offers

of peace and mediation which stirred among America's allies
and Europe's neutrals.

Encouraged by the success at

Charleston in May, 1780, Britain looked forward to military
26 aalloway, Historical and Political Reflections on
the Rise and Progress of the American Rebellion, p.-55.

27

Ibid., p. 131.

and naval campaigns of 1781 as the final steps to victories
which would shatter the rebellion and bring the colonists to
terms as well as drive the French from the West Indies.
The gamble failed at Yorktown in October, 1781.

The

hint of disaster came earlier with the loss of Pensacola to
Spain in May, 1781.

And Yorktown was followed quickly by

the recapture of St. Eustatius and San Martin in the West
Indies by the French in November, 1781.

The French also

seized Demararra and Essequibo in January, 1782, and picked
off British-held San Cristobal, Nevis and Montserrat in February, 1782.

This string of British disasters was completed
28
with the surrender of Minorca to Spain in February, 1782.
An angry opposition in Parliament was waiting after
the Christmas recess.

Not even the removal of the American

Secretary, George Germain, would satisfy those members determined to bring down the North Ministry and end the American War.

The critical measure was a motion in Commons

February 27, 1782 by General Conway, declaring as enemies of
the King and nation any one attempting to carry on offensive
war in America.

The motion also granted permission for in-

troduction of an enabling act authorizing the King to make
peace with the Colonies.

Conway's motion carried by nine-

teen votes, a clear indication that the mood of Parliament
28 Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution,
p. 192.
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and perhaps the nation had shifted.

29

Not until March 20th

did Lord North notify the King of his unswerving determination to resign.

In its final weeks, the North Ministry sent

agents to Holland, and to France to attempt to split off
America's allies with hints of terms more generous if they
would abandon the Americans.

John Adams at The Hague was
also approached by a British agent suggesting a truce. 30

But before these feelers moved beyond the opening stage
their instigator, Lord North, was out of office, and a new
Ministry took over the peace negotiations.
The high ground of the watershed of 1778 had been
passed, and by the end of 1781 the new trend had become
clear enough for all to perceive.

Events were moving in a

different direction, and new men were at the helm of British
policy.

29

Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 253.

30

Ibid., pp. 256-257.

CHAPTER V
NEGOTIATIONS--THE LAST CHANCE
FOR RECONCILIATION
The fall of the North Ministry on March 20th made
abundantly clear one central fact:

the mood of Parliament

and perhaps the nation in the Spring of 1782 demanded peace.
No matter that British forces still held the key ports of
Savannah, Charleston and New York.

In addition, they had

the capability to conduct raids in force outside these
strong points--though perhaps at considerable risk of irreplaceable losses of manpower and materiel.

Seven years of

warfare, however, had demonstrated British inability to
control any widespread area in the Colonies over an extended
period.

Britain's sea power was stretched perilously close

to the breaking point around the world.

She stood alone in

Europe.

The need for peace was written in bold letters for
all to see. 1
But the shape and details of peace both with the colonies and their European allies were less clear.

Much of

what would be written into the final treaty between Great
Britain and America remained to be determined by elements
1vincent T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British
Empire (2 vols., London, 1952), I, 223.
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beyond the grasp of the American negotiators.

The King's

stubbornness, Whig ambitions for power, the demands for domestic reform in England and struggles for power among Whig
politicians all had an impact on the negotiations.

To this

potpourri of conflicting forces must be added the personalities of those who held office under George III, especially
William Petty, the Earl of Shelburne.
There is no doubt that Shelburne was the King's choice
and the King's agent in the peace negotiations.

Nonethe-

less, the events of 1782 were guided to a considerable
extent by Shelburne's own conceptions of the American past
and present, but most definitely by his perceptions of
America's future role and its relationship to Great Britain.
This perception of the American future by Shelburne changed
to accommodate the developments of 1782 as the negotiations
unfolded in Paris and military events strengthened Britain's
position.

Three subtly but distinctly different strategies

emerge in Shelburne's scheme of peace-making.

The first

demonstrated Shelburne's belief that America would accept
an autonomous role within the framework of the British
Empire.

It was a position consistent with Shelburne 1 s

earlier declarations before assuming his ministerial
role.

These had certainly contributed to the esteem with

which he was held by the King.
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As the colonial response to the autonomy plan showed
its failure, Shelburne swung to acceptance of American independence with the retention of some sort of Federal alliance
between the two nations.

"Independence" in the usage of

18th century England did not carry all of the same connotations that it does to 20th century Americans.

We have

already seen that American independence in the view of one
Englishman, John Cartwright, was compatible with a "Grand
British League and Confederacy"

2

providing a defense and

trade umbrella covering both England and America. 3

Thus,

"independence" in terminology of the 18th century did not
necessarily mean sovereignity.

During the middle period of

the negotiations this kind of framework appeared to be Shelburne's objective.
Finally, Shelburne came to sense the impossibility of
an immediate political reconciliation between the colonies
and Great Britain.

His efforts shifted to a settlement

which would assure that America did not become a French satellite, including a commercial treaty to guarantee continued
Anglo-American trade and a hope that the generosity of the
peace terms coupled with trade would lead to a future Federal Union between the two great Atlantic powers.

The

2 cartwright, American Independence, the Interest and
Glory of Great Britain, p. 1.

3Ibid., p. 63.
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treaty of peace which he largely fashioned was intended to
encourage and accelerate the formation of a future transatlantic grand alliance or federal union. 4
Shelburne was a key member of the Rockingham Ministry,
a strange melange of political viewpoints and personalities.
The aged and ailing Lord Rockingham, leader of the opposition Whigs, was its nominal head as First Lord of the Treasury.

Shelburne's post was Secretary of State for Home,

Colonial and Irish Affairs, and presumably, resolution of
the American problem would fall within the scope of his
responsibilities.
Shelburne had indeed been the King's first choice to
succeed North, but his support in Parliament was much too
small to sustain him in the Prime·Ministership.

Nonethe-

less, the King chose to consider Shelburne as Prime Minister
de facto, and would deal with Rockingham only jointly with
Shelburne or through Shelburne. 5

Shelburne thus because of

his Cabinet assignment, and because of the King's reliance
upon him became a key figure in directing the negotiations
for peace and in shaping British policy.
Why Shelburne?

The question is an important one

because of the role he was to play in the American peace

4Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,
Empire, p. 228.

5Ibid., p. 225.
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treaty.

The Dublin-born Shelburne was known to support the

idea of a strong monarchy, a position which commended him to
6
George III.
In addition, he had spoken out on numerous
occasions in Parliament against independence for America
while at the same time supporting American rights.

His

background knowledge on American affairs included serving as
Colonial Secretary in Chatham 1 s Ministry and as President of
the Board of Trade in the Grenville Ministry.

Thus, he had

some claim of expertise in American affairs as well as having enjoyed" • . • cordial relations with Benjamin Franklin
and other prominent Americans . . • • 117

These were attri-

butes obviously needed in resolving the problems England
faced in the post-Yorktown months of 1782.

On the other

hand, his reputation as a domestic reformer was less radical
than that of some Whigs who pressed for changes in Parliamentary representation and curtailment of the King's authority.
In brief, in a choice between evils, Shelburne
appeared to the King to be the lesser, a man who
might still pull out of his box of tricks one ghat
would spare the King his crowning humiliation.
But Shelburne brought to his task of peacemaking some
grave political liabilities.

He had been accused of

6Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 257.
7Harlow, The Founding or the Second
p. 226.
8Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 257.
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deception so frequently, he had earned the nickname, ttthe
Jesuit of Berkeley· Square."

And as mentioned earlier, his

personal following in Parliament was small.9

Within the

Cabinet he faced a fierce personal and political rivalry
with Charles James Fox, who held the post of Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.

Fox blamed Shelburne for bring-

ing about the removal of Fox's father from the lucrative
office of Army paymaster some years earlier.

The Fox-

Shelburne rivalry quickly generated the first issue of the
American negotiations.

Who was responsible for undertaking

the peacemaking--Fox or Shelburne?

Each had a claim to

leadership and each had a different approach to the question.
When the Rockingham group took office on March 27,
1782, it appeared that Fox would be in charge of negotiations.

A Minute of Cabinet March 30th recorded Cabinet

agreement to evacuate British troops from Savannah, Charleston and New York immediately. 10 This step, had it been
taken, would have been a de facto grant of independence to
the colonies, and placed th.e peace negotiations in Fox's
sphere of foreign affairs.

Fox argued that as Secretary for

Foreign Affairs he would direct the negotiation of peace
9Ib1d., p. 260.
10

435.

Fortescue, Correspondence of King George III, V,
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treaties with all the sovereign nations at war with Great
Britain.

Since a state of war clearly existed between Great

Britain and her former colonies in North America, establishing a peace with them was a logical extension of his responsibilities.

To assure his role--and necessarily to

eliminate Shelburne 1 s--Fox proposed an immediate grant of
independence to the American colonies.

This would be fol-

lowed by a quick peace treaty, and the end of American
participation in what had become a global war.
the Franco-American alliance would be made.

A crack in

Britain freed

from the burden of the American War would then be in a position to negotiate better terms of peace with its other
enemies, France, Spain and Holland.
question will be:

The forever unanswered

was Fox's plan motivated by his personal

rivalry with Shelburne?

Or did events simply fan the flames

of the natural antagonism between the two men?
Shelburne obviously had a contrasting approach to the
peace negotiations.

He argued that independence should be

granted to the Americans only as the first condition of a
peace treaty.

The initial Rockingham proposal for evacuat-

ing the key American seaports seems to have died primarily
because of Shelburne's alternative plans.

The belief grew

that Shelburne sought a new relationship between England
and America short of independence. 11
11

L

His position as

Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 260.
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Colonial Secretary, and his known views on America as well
as his insistence on controlling negotiations appeared to
support this position.

His previous speeches in Parliament

had clearly established his opposition to independence, but
granting to Americans many of the privileges they asked for.
As a follower of Lord Chatham and a supporter of the Empire
he had spoken out against a final break between England and
the Colonies.
In a major address on the American question in April,

1778, Shelburne told the House of Lords, " • • . he was fully
convinced that America was not lost. 1112

He went on to point

out that acceptance of the idea of American independence
could only lead to future loss of Canada, the West Indies
and the Bahamas.

"America must obtain justice and security,

and whatever difficulties may arise to obstruct it, I have
no doubt but she may be again happily reunited to Great
Britain," he added. 1 3

Later in November of the same year,

Shelburne emphasized to the House of Lords, "A real union
must be ·rormed upon the plan of the British constitution

. . . .1114
Shelburne's ideas for the future were not, however,
confined to considerations of immediate expediency.
He was deeply convinced that the British Constitution (purged and reformed) was the surest guarantee of
12 Parliamentary History, XIX, 1032.
13
Ibid., p. 1052.
14
Ib1d., p. 1310.
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liberty and had, moreover, a universal validity; a
proposition which on the second count still awaits
final determination. Conscious of the gigantic
potentialities of the North American continent, he
considered that the abandonment by the Thirteen
Colonies of a balanced monarchical system of government and their consequent decline into "democratical"
republicanism and probable anarchy would be a major
catastrophe. On the other hand, the colonization of
a continent under free ordered government, and directed by a completely autonomous American authority,
linked to Britain by allegiance to a common Crown,
would mean the growth of a great transatlantic
society, practising and guaranteeing for its parts
political and economic freedom.15
Further indications of Shelburne's position come from
a letter written by one of North's agents to John Adams,
"Lord Shelburne is the only new minister suspected of not
wishing to go the length of declaring American independence."

16

On the other hand, John Norris in his biography of

Shelburne declares the idea of reconciliation was shared by
other Cabinet members.
Shelburne has been pictured as the lone liberal
champion of the idea of federal union. But the
truth is that it was a popular idea among the members of the new Ministry in the spring of 1782 and
by no means peculiar to Shelburne.17
Norris gives as his source the London General Advertiser of
June 14, 1782.
Dualism of policy had been a hallmark of the North
Ministry, and the Rockingham team quickly established its
1 5Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,

p. 228.
16Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 260.

1 7John Norris, Shelburne and Reform (London, 1963)
p. 167.
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own adeptness at this tactic.

Faced with two rival Minis-

ters, each determined to pursue differing methods of bringing the American War to an end, the Cabinet permitted each
to proceed simultaneously.

It was further evidence of Rock-

ingham's inability to direct affairs as well as the special
position Shelburne held in relation to the King.

Further,

the Cabinet in its modern sense did not exist in 1782.

Each

Minister operated his department as a separate unit and was
responsible directly to the King rather than a Prime Minister .18

So both Shelburne and Fox, each in his own way,

sought the road to peace with America.
Even before news of the North Ministry's fall reached
Paris, Franklin seized-a convenient opportunity to write directly to Shelburne.

Writing as an old friend, Franklin

hinted at American desires for peace, and expressed his continued friendship and admiration for Shelburne.

The let-

ter's arrival provided Shelburne the opening he needed in
his power struggle with Fox.

With Cabinet concurrence he

dispatched a representative, Richard Oswald, to Paris to
meet and sound out Franklin.

Simultaneously, Henry Laurens,

former President of the Continental

Cong~ess

and also an

American Peace Commissioner, though a British prisoner, was
gran~ed

parole from the Tower of London and sent to The

l8Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,
p. 223.
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Netherlands to test the peace possibilities with John Adams,
another American Peace Commissioner.

Adams was also Minis-

ter to The Netherlands on behalf of Congress.

The Laurens-

Adams talks seemed to indicate an inflexible American
position on independence.

But Richard Oswald's report of

his meetings with Franklin were more promising to Shelburne' s reconciliation gambit.
Oswald, an elderly

~cottish

merchant, appears to be a

strange choice for the diplomatic mission at hand.

Yet he

had been carefully selected for a number of reasons.

He was

a long-time acquaintance of Shelburne, who had met him
through the economist, Adam Smith.

He had lived in America

as a young man, and still owned property there.

He was sym-

pathetic to the American cause, but hopeful that the Colonies would agree to a status short of independence.

In

short, his political thinking as it related to America
seemed close to Shelburne's.

And since some sort of commer-

cial agreement appeared essential to bringing about Shelburne's new Anglo-American relationship, Oswald, as a
merchant trader and American businessman seemed to have the
knowledge required.

Moreover, by age, personality and back-

ground he appeared more likely to establish a cordial relationship with Franklin, then England's best chance for
peace, than any other available agent.

19

l9Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution,

p. 194.
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Oswald reached Paris on April 12th.

His mission was

to sound out Franklin on the possibility of a separate peace
between England and

Amer~ca.

Franklin quickly established

that France and America would work jointly for a peace.

To

hammer home that point, Franklin and Oswald visited
Vergennes at Versailles on April 17th.

Vergennes reiterated

Franklin's stand that a general peace negotiated with all
belligerents was the only course acceptable to France.
However, before Oswald returned to London, Franklin
met privately with Shelburne's emissary.

Franklin's purpose

as he relates 1 t, was to ". . . draw out something of the
Mind of hls Court on the Subject of Canada and Nova
Scotia. 112
Franklin's suggestion that Great Britain volun-

°

tarily cede Nova Scotia and Canada to the new United States
as a gesture of friendship and to forestall future conflicts
has been viewed by most historians with some amazement.
Such a step had no endorsement from the French from whom
Franklin concealed his proposal.

Bemis suggests Franklin's

role in the abortive attempt to capture Montreal and Quebec
in 1775-76 " . . . had the result of fixing Canada as a quest
21
in Franklin's subtle mind."
Morris ls equally puzzled at
Franklin's proposal.
20

21
p. 197.

Smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, VIII, 469.
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99
It is inexplicable that the principal proponent
of diplomatic unity with the French ally would entrust to an enemy's hands a document revealing that
America was prepared to accept territory whose acquisition by the United States France had long
opposed, and make such a proposal behind the backs
of his good friends in the French Ministry.22
But Franklin's perplexing proposal was indeed something both

11

. . . curious and s i gni f leant • • • • rr23

Frank-

lin, putting his ideas before Oswald, stressed that "his
Nation seem'd to desire Reconciliation with America; that I
heartily wish'd the same thing . . • .

1124

Should Britain

continue to hold Canada, Franklin added that the hazards
" • • • would necessarily oblige us to cultivate and
2
strengthen our Union with France." 5 At Oswald's request
and after a little delay, Franklin gave to Oswald a copy of
his "Notes for Conversation" on Canada and the reasons why
it should be voluntarily ceded to the former British colonies, now called the United States.
Franklin's arguments repeated the theme that "By the
late Debates in Parliament, and publick Writings, it
appears that Britain desires a Reconciliation with the
26
Americans."
As for reparations, Franklin suggested,
22 Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 264.
23
Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,

p. 248.

24 Smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, VII, 470.
2 5Ib1d.
26

Ibid., p. 471.
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• • • But would it not be better for England to
offer it? Nothing would have a greater Tendency to
conciliate, and much of the future Commerce and returning Intercourse between the two Countries may
depend on Reconciliation. Would not the advantage
of Reconciliation by such means be greater than the
Expence?27
He added,
But on the Minds of people would it not have an excellent effect, if Britain should voluntarily offer
to give up this Province; tho' on these Conditions,
that she shall in all times coming have and enjoy
the right of Free Trade thither, unincumbered with
any Duties whatsoever; that so much of the vacant
Lands there shall be sold, as will raise a sum sufficient to pay for the Houses burnt by the British
troops and their Indians; and also to indemnify the
Royalists for the Confiscation of their Estates?28
Franklin was aware that Oswald and the man he represented, Lord Shelburne, were identified with a group" • • •
who looked to an expanding partnership between British manufacturer and American pioneer as being in the best interests
of both. 112 9

Thus his proposal was a shrewd test of the sin-

cerity of British appeals for reconciliation.

It was a

signal from Franklin to Shelburne of his willingness to pursue reconciliation and a warning that reconciliation meant
making America the sole agent of Anglo-American authority in
North America, not a subordinate partner.

27

This would be the

Ibid., p. 472.

28 Ibid.
29Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,
p. 248.
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only guarantee of British objectives Americans could recognize and accept.

For it would remove once and for all Brit-

ish military power from the American continent.

The idea of

free trade further suggests a test of English willingness to
bring Americans within the scheme of Empire navigation regulations, and to re-establish trade between England and
America on these principles.

If indeed Lord Shelburne's

emissary carried a message of conciliation, Franklin opened
wide the doorway to the future.

From an American standpoint

these were the terms which would make it possible for a
restoration of the Anglo-American relationship as Franklin
Oswald responded that" . . . nothing . . • could be
,,30
At least, Oswald
clearer, more satisfactory • .
saw it.

offered no immediate objections to Franklin's ideas, asking
for a copy of his notes and carrying them back to Shelburne
in London.

Perhaps, at no time was reconciliation so close

to realization as it was in the first meeting between Oswald
and Franklin.
Laurens' visit to Adams at Haarlem on April 15th produced less encouraging news than Oswald brought back.

It

appeared that America's peace commissioners were agreed that
a peace settlement arrived at in concert with America's
allies was the only basis on which they would undertake
30

smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, VIII, 473.
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negotiations.

In addition, Adams seemed much less respon-

sive to English approaches than was Franklin.

For the stub-

born Adams demanded British recognition of American
independence as a precondition to even starting negotiations.
This was more than the tactful Franklin had asked in his
meetings with Oswald.
Shelburne was hopefully probing for the channel
through which the Colonies could still be retained as a part
of the Empire.
In Shelburne's mind the American and the Irish
problems were both "imperial" and were closely
associated. His handling of the Irish demand for
independence in 1782 was on parallel lines to his
approach to the American Commissioners in Paris.
But the self-government for America and Ireland
within the Empire which he strove to establish
would have approximated in degree, if not in form,
to that enjoyed by the British Dominions in 1914-with the addition of an Imperial Zollverein and a
"Free trade" connection between the British group
and one or more foreign powers.31
The Cabinet on April 23rd agreed that Oswald should
return to Paris.

He was directed to meet with Franklin to

designate Paris as the site of future negotiations and set
up a schedule of meetings.

But Oswald was given no author-

ity to enter into negotiations with Franklin.

He was

. . • "to represent to him (Franklinl that the
principal points in contemplation are the allowance of independence to America, upon Great Britain

31
Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,
I, 232.

103
being restored to the situation she was placed in
by the Treaty of 1763."32
Does the word "independence" indicate that as early as
April 23rd Shelburne had already abandoned autonomy in favor
of full American sovereignity?

There is considerable doubt

that Shelburne or Whig politicians attached the same connotations to "independence" which Americans did then or now.
George III writing to Shelburne on another matter April 12th
listed among the terms on which the Rockingham Ministry took
office. "No veto to the Independence of America. 1133 Still
the King persisted in a hope until much later that America
would accept less than full sovereignity.3 4

The word as

used clearly lacks precision, and its meaning ranged from
independence in local government to full sovereignity.
A further indicator of this interpretation is the fact
that the same April 23rd Cabinet meeting set in motion instructions to Sir Guy Carleton, now commander of British
military forces in America, and to Admiral Robert Digby,
naval commander, to seek a truce.

Both Bemis and Morris

view Carleton's appeals to Washington, to Congress, and
finally to the public as an attempt to by-pass the American
32

Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 268.

33Fortescue, Correspondence of King George III, V, 452.

34

Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 286.
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II

Peace Commissioners.

Lord Shelburne did not overlook

the chance of separate peace negotiations with the 'Provinces' on American soil. 11 35

"Notwithstanding the fiasco of

the Carlisle Commission to Congress in 1778, he [Shelburne]
decided to make another direct appeal to Congress and the
American people."36
There is also the possibility, elaborated by Morris,
that the Carleton-Digby efforts were a part of Shelburne's
plan of reconciliation with America on terms short of independence.

"As if to emphasize his personal involvement in

the fate of this mission, Shelburne dispatched his private
secretary, Maurice Morgann, to Join Carleton in New York. 1137
But Morgann's reports to Shelburne offered no encouragement
for any restoration of imperial relationships between
America and England.
Fitzmaurice, Shelburne's biographer, sees the messages
Carleton and Digby were directed to convey to Washington and
to Congress in a somewhat different light.

It was an effort

to husband British resources for the war still in progress
in other theaters.

The British hoped as well to discourage

the Americans from launching attacks on the remaining British garrisons in New York, Charleston and Savannah, and to
35Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution,
p. 201.

36Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 268.
37 Ibid., p. 269.
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insure that the negotiations in Paris were not jeopardized
by American support of French or Spanish campaigns in the

summer of 1782.

There was no intention, Fitzmaurice

believes, of by-passing the American Peace Commissioners in
Paris or seeking terms of less than independence from
Congress.

Shelburne's instructions were at least ambiguous.

"You must therefore convince them," Shelburne wrote to
Carleton and Digby, "that the great object on this country
is, not merely peace, but reconciliation with America on the
noblest terms and by the noblest means. 11 38 Whatever the
true purpose of the Carleton-Digby proposals, they failed to
ignite any interest in America.

General Washington passed

on Carleton's proposals to Congress, which refused to consider a truce or any other negotiations while the Peace Commissioners in Paris remained charged with that duty.
Oswald returned to Paris on May 4th.

On May 8th he

was joined by Thomas Grenville, representing the Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, Fox.

The duel between Shelburne and

Fox over control of the American negotiations had begun in
earnest.

This rivalry was encouraged by Franklin's skillful

hints that Grenville's commission was incomplete and inadequate for the American peace negotiations.39

When the

Enabling Act authorizing the King to undertake peace nego38

Fitzmaurice, The Life of William Petty, Earl of
Shelburne, II, 135-130:39Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 276.
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tiations with the Americans finally cleared Parliament on
June 17th, 40 Shelburne moved ahead with a commission for
Oswald as the negotiator.

Fox responded with a demand for

Oswald's recall, which was overruled by the Cabinet.

On

June 30th, in a Cabinet meeting Fox deliberately challenged
the Shelburne position with the proposal that American independence should be granted with or without a peace treaty.
The Cabinet voted down his plan, and Fox resigned. 41 A day
later Lord Rockingham died, a victim of the influenza epi- _
demic sweeping Europe.

The King quickly offered the post of
First Lord of the Treasury to Lord Shelburne on July 2nd. 42
The American negotiations were now completely within control
of the English leader who had conspicuously advocated reconciliation and reunion both as a member of the Opposition and
the Administration.
Fears that Britain's use of the word "independence"
did not coincide with their own grew in the American Peace
Commission in Paris, now increased by the arrival of John
Jay from Madrid.

Franklin recorded in his "Journal of

Negotiations for Peace" on June 27th a warning from French
intelligence of English efforts to" . . . stir up the People

40

Ibid., p. 280.

41 Ib1d.
42 Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,

I, 261.
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to call on Congress to accept those Terms, they being similar to those settling with Ireland. 1143

And writing to

Benjamin Vaughan on July 11th, Franklin quotes from Vaughn's
earlier May 11th letter a reference to "•a proposed dependent State of America which you thought Mr. Oswald would
begin with.' "

44

Franklin also told Vaughn,

It is now intimated to me from several quarters,
that Lord Shelburne's plan is, to retain the sovereignty for the King, giving us otherwise an independent Parliament, and a government similar to that
of late intended for Ireland. If this be really his
project, our negotiations for peace will not go very
far.45
Franklin also recognized Shelburne's belief in a continuing
Anglo-American relationship and his desire for reconciliation.

II

• Though Lord Shelburne might formerly have

entertained such an idea, he had probably dropped it before
1146
Franklin wrote in the
he sent Mr. Oswald here . . • •
almost certain knowledge his words would reach Shelburne via
the gossipy Vaughn.
Thus, July, 1782 appears to mark an end to the first
phase of Shelburne's plan for reconciliation and reunion.
Franklin's signal of willingness to proceed had carried a

43 smyth, The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, VIII, 555.
44 Ibid., p. 565
45

Ibid., p. 566.

46 Ibid.
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price, Canada, which was beyond the political realities in
Parliament.

The soundings at Haarlem, and at New York via

Digby and Carleton had been negative.

On the other hand,

Shelburne's rival, Fox, had been eliminated from the
Cabinet, and with Rockingham's demise, Shelburne was in full
control of the negotiations.
In Paris on July 10th, Franklin delivered to Oswald
his ideas of the four necessary articles and four advisable
articles for inclusion in the pending peace treaty.

The

four necessary items were
• • • Independence full and complete in every sense,
to the Thirteen States • • • • settlement of the
boundaries; • • • confinement of the boundary of
Canada • . • • freedom of fishing En the banks of
Newfoundland and elsewhere . . • • 7
Franklin's advisable articles were indemnification of
Americans for property damage caused by the war; admission
of war guilt by the British; the United States to enjoy
the same trade rights in England and Ireland as English
subjects; and finally cession of Canada. 48

The emphasis

and detailed definition Franklin placed upon the first
necessary article of the peace terms, independence, is a
clear indication of how critical this issue had become.
Obviously, the American negotiators recognized the

47Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution,
p. 207.

48 rbid., pp. 207 - 208 .
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differences in interpretation placed upon this word.

In

addition, Franklin firmly broke off further talks with
Oswald the next day pending a clarification of the British
interpretation of independence. 49
To Oswald's quick pleas for clarification of the British position and intentions on independence, Lord Shelburne
responded in a letter dated July 27th.

He also enclosed a

copy of his earlier instructions to Carleton and Digby in
America, showing his moves there to bring about a truce were
directed toward American withdrawal from the war and discouraging her further efforts on behalf of France and Spain.
Shelburne's instructions to Oswald pledged" • • • the most
unequivocal acknowledgement of American Independency
1150

Shelburne promised a commission authorizing

Oswald to conclude a treaty with the Americans on the basis
of" . • • the Independency of the Colonies ••

Hav-

ing made these firm declarations, Shelburne once more added
an ambiguity for which he became notorious:
You very well know I have never made a secret of
the deep concern I feel in the separation of countries united by blood, by principles, habits and
every tie short of territorial proximity . . • •
That it shall be done decidedly, so as to avoid all

49
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future riske of enmity, and lay the foundation of
a new connection better adapted to the present
temper and interests of both countries . . . . My
private opinion would lead me to go a great way
for Federal union; but is either country ripe for
it? If 5~ot means must be left to advance it

..

When his commission arrived on August 6th Oswald was
further adjured " . • • to do everything in his power to prevent the United States from entering into a binding connection with any other power. 1153 He was also urged".
to propose an unreserved system of naturalization as the
1154
foundation of a future amicable connection

....

Oswald's letter on independence from Shelburne and his
later instructions illustrated his changing view toward
America.

Instead of reconciliation within the Empire,

America was to be linked to Great Britain by a possible
federal union or through a form of dual citizenship of its
residents.

Both terms defy definition and Shelburne never

presumed to provide more precise meaning to them.

They are

evidence, however, of his efforts to· find the path which
would continue some kind of relationship between Great
Britain and its former colonies.

It is clearly a different

path than his earlier efforts sought.

But it continued the

52
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53 rb1d., p. 170.
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concept of reconciliation which might ultimately lead to
genuine reunion between Great Britain and America.
So far as the actual treaty terms, Shelburne 1 s letter
of July 27 committed him only to Franklin's four necessary
articles--independence, abandonment of any British claim to
territory north of the Ohio added to Canada under the Quebec
Act, and granting to America of fishery rights off Newfoundland. 55

Franklin's advisable articles were dismissed as

unacceptable.

The sticking point, however, was Oswald's

commission, which referred not to the United States by name,
but to
. any commissioner or commissioners, named
be named by the said colonies and plantations,
with any body or bodies, corporate or politic,
any assembly or assemblies, or descriptions of
or person or persons whatsoever . • • • or any
or parts thereor.56

or to
or
or
men,
part

The wording of Oswald's Commission may have been a
deliberate attempt to test the unity of the American Commissioners and their allies.

More likely it was shaped by

British reluctance to grant anything which could be construed as independence for America in advance of a binding
agreement for peace.

For Shelburne 1 s intention--indeed,

Fox's too--had been to reach a peace settlement with America
or with her European allies separately so as to strengthen

55Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 295.
56
Ibid., p 296.
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Britain's hand in dealing with whichever were the remaining
belligerent forces.

John Jay's angry rejection of the

Oswald commission without explicit recognition of America's
status as a nation when contrasted to Franklin and
Vergennes' acceptance signalled what England and Shelburne
had been waiting for--a split among the Allies.57

Suddenly,

in late August Franklin became seriously ill; for the foreseeable future the negotiations would be in the hands of
Jay, who had already clashed with Vergennes as well as
America's other ally, Spain.
John Jay was the crack in the Franco-American
alliance, and the question presented to Shelburne was how
best to exploit it.

Earlier events limited his options.

Parliament in February had voted an end to offensive warfare
in America.

He could not seek a quick peace with the Euro-

pean belligerents, and then turn on America.
America had to come first.

Peace with

Thus, on August 23, 1782 the

Cabinet authorized the dispatch of reinforcements to
Gibraltar, then besieged by a joint French-Spanish force.5 8
Five days later Shelburne presented to Cabinet his plans for
peace with America.

The British strategy of reconciliation

and reunion entered its third and final phase.

After a day

57Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,
I, 277, 283.
58 Fortescue, Correspondence of King George III, VI,
113.
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of hesitancy the Cabinet agreed" . • • to offer generous
terms to the Americans including a compromise on independence .1159

Shelburne's cabinet agreed the basis for peace

would be Franklin's four necessary articles.

In addition,

Oswald's instructions as determined by the Cabinet

11
•••

permitted him to waive stipulating by treaty for payment of
prewar debts owing British merchants as well as for compensation to the Loyalists. 1160 These terms did not reach
Oswald in Paris until September 4th.

Meanwhile two days

earlier, Jay produced a solution to the deadlock over the
wording of Oswald's commission describing the American
plenipotentiaries.

Jay proposed to Oswald the phrase "the

Thirteen United States of America," as the designation for
the American Peace Commissioners' constituency. 61 Franklin
concurred in the change, and Oswald wrote to request the rewording.

The Cabinet with some reluctance approved the

change on September 18th.

The tempest over the wording of

Oswald's commission seems strange in light of Shelburne's
letter to Oswald for Franklin in April.
said

59

60

61
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• • • on our part commissions will be moved, or any
character given to Mr. Oswald, which Dr. Franklin
and he may judge conducive to a final settlement of
terms between Great Britain and America.62
Britain's terms as stated in Oswald's August 29th
instructions sketched in outline form Shelburne 1 s American
policy; peace, independence without client status to any
nation, encouragement to Americans to look westward to the
vast undeveloped interior of western America and the possibility of close commercial ties which could conceivably
lead to reunion at some distant date. 6 3 The logic behind
the final stage of Shelburne 1 s reconciliation plan was
simply that generous terms of the Americans coupled with a
commercial treaty might accomplish the reunion which could
not be achieved through negotiation at Paris.

It was a

policy consistent with every position Shelburne had declared
earlier as a member of Lords, and as Colonial Secretary in
the Rockingham Ministry when he sought to re-establish the
Anglo-American relationship through direct political ties.
Accomplishment of Shelburne's plan was to prove more
difficult.

The Cabinet's August 29th instructions to Oswald

had been agreed to only reluctantly by the Lord Chancellor,
Edward Thurlow, and Lord Ashburton.

Since the Cabinet meet-

ing which ratified Oswald's instructions, news had reached

62 Fitzmaurice, The Life
Shelburne, II, 136.

of William Petty, Earl or

63 Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution,
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London on September 30th of the total defeat of the FrenchSpanish forces besieging Gibraltar.
to gain an early peace was dwindling.

The urgency for England
The pressures upon

individual Cabinet members from interest groups within
England were growing

If the terms of the Anglo-American

peace treaty were to be built largely upon Franklin's four
necessary articles large and vocal segments of the British
public might be angered.

These included those with holdings

in America confiscated by the rebels, merchants owed debts
by Americans, Canadian traders, the refugee Loyalists who
had fled to England or other English colonies and the hardcore colonialists in England opposed to all things American.
The political climate in London had cooled significantly from what it had been in late August by the time the
draft of a preliminary treaty written by Jay and agreed to
by Oswald reached London on October 11th.

Not only did the

proposed Treaty follow Franklin's four necessary articles,
it also provided for reciprocal free trade between America
and the British Empire--exempting only the Hudson's Bay and
East India monoplies. 64

In line with Shelburne's expressed

concept" . . . that it shall be done decidedly, so as to
avoid all future risk of enmity . . . " the boundaries were
64
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generous. 6 5

The future United States was to extend west-

ward to the Mississippi, despite the efforts of its allies,
France and Spain, to limit it to the Allegheny-Appalachian
line.

Fishery rights on Newfoundland were also established

in the draft treaty.
When the Cabinet met on October 17th it found the proposed treaty unacceptable from several standpoints.

It was

impossible to grant reciprocal free trade rights to the
American nation by treaty without the prior passage of
enabling legislation by Parliament.

Thus, Oswald was di-

rected to remove any language about commercial reciprocity,
and propose that commercial matters be postponed to subsequent negotiation.

The Cabinet insisted that Americans

recognize and promise to pay their prewar debts to English
merchants.

The Newfoundland fishery rights were viewed

skeptically and Oswald told drying rights on Newfoundland
and Labrador could not be granted.

Finally, there was the

question of compensating Loyalists in America for their loss
of property through confiscation and riot, Oswald was directed to use a demand for the Old Northwest Territory
(north of the Ohio River) or for an enlarged Nova Scotia as
a lever to gain something for the Loyalists.

65

" . • • He
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should state Your Majesty's right to the Back Country and
urge it as a means of providing for the Refugees . . . • 1166
For Shelburne time was running out.

Parliament was

scheduled to meet on November 26th, and he needed a treaty
in hand before that date.

The remaining issues--fisheries,

debts and Loyalists--were in no instance critical to his
concept of peace, but each individually had the potential
for blocking the ratification of the treaty in Parliament. 67
Two more drafts passed between Paris and London.

The King

was persuaded to prorogue Parliament until December 5th to
allow the negotiators a few more days in which to try to
find agreement.

The final compromise reached on November

29th adjusted the fishery to a liberty rather than a right. 68
The Americans agreed ·that Congress would recommend to the
states restitution of Loyalist property and a cessation of
future confiscations.69
The treaty in its final draft was still fundamentally
Franklin's four necessary articles and Oswald's August 29th
instructions from Shelburne.

The final critical session

on the fisheries, debts and. Loyalists had done nothing to
66
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alter the overall objective of Shelburne's diplomacy-reconciliation and ultimately reunion.

True, the framework

within which his plans would operate had changed.

From

initially a simple grant of legislative autonomy to the
North American colonies, Shelburne adjusted his plan to
political realities on both sides of the Atlantic.

Federal

union or common citizenship had also been tested and was
found unacceptable.

The final plan--generous terms and a

proposed swift move to restore commercial.ties which might
lead to ultimate reunion--had succeeded.
Shelburne hated the idea of separation. For him
it was something vicious and unnatural, a failure
that would gravely injure both societies. They came
of the same stock; they represented the same culture; and their destinies were inexorably interwoven.
As he saw it, America could not deny her heritage
of Anglo-Saxon institutions without disaster to
herself . • • • By means of parliamentary, administrative and fiscal reforms, he set himself to provide the Anglo-American association of the future
with a "new deal." Meantime, he reluctantly
accepted separation as unavoidable and endeavored to
establish interim conditions that would facilitate
and not impede the process of reconciliation.70
Not only had the progress toward peace between England
and America been shaped by Britain's policy of reconciliation and reunion, so too had the terms itself felt its
impact.

But one major element of the policy remained

unresolved--the restoration of commercial ties between Great
Britain and its former colonies.
70Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,

I, 311.

CHAPTER VI
RATIFICATION, COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS
AND THE END OF RECONCILIATION
If legend and tradition contain a germ of truth, it
was a foggy, gray Thursday, December 5, 1782 when George III
made his grim announcement of American independence in the
speech opening Parliament's fall session.

Reportedly the

last King of America hesitated as if choking before he
uttered the despised word "independence." 1 Once he had
overcome his initial repugnance, the King was able to articulate the peace objectives of the First Lord of the Treasury, the Earl of Shelburne.

These aimed at " . • • an entire
and cordial reconciliation with those colonies." 2 "Rellgion, language, interests, affections," the King told his
listeners in Westminster, "may and I hope will yet prove
bonds of permanent union between the two countries; to this
end neither attention nor disposition on my part shall be
wanting." 3
Shelburne in December, 1782 could look back on a major
diplomatic triumph--bringing the Americans to terms in what
1
2
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appeared to be a politically acceptable peace treaty.

He

still faced the prospect of winning ratification in Parliament where he had never commanded a substantial personal
group, and where he could claim no party following.

In

addition, he faced the task of achieving acceptance of a
major revision in England's trade policy toward America and
the world by revamping the Navigation Acts.

This would be

essential before a commercial treaty could be negotiated
and the ties between Great Britain and her former colonies
restored.

"The peace treaty," as Shelburne saw it, "could

thus be a first step leading to a rapprochement; at the
least, to friendship and commercial alliance, and perhaps in
the end to some form of political association. 114
In accomplishing both steps, Shelburne faced major
hazards.

Never a charismatic figure nor even a skillful

politician, Shelburne had also acquired numerous enemies in
his career.

They ranged from Charles James· Fox, his rival

for power in the Rockingham Ministry to Viscount Keppel,
First Lord of the Admiralty, who had resigned from Shelburne' s cabinet at the first word of the preliminary terms.
Shelburne faced a Parliament which included men who had
suffered financially from his Administrative reforms, who
feared his zeal for electoral change and who were prepared
4

I, 234.
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to cling to the comfortable patterns of trade under the
Navigation Acts.

But above all Shelburne carried the burden

of responsibility for ending the American War.

From hind-

sight, North, Germain, Stormont and all the others who had
found victory or reconciliation on Ministry terms so elusive
from 1775 onward suddenly discovered in Shelburne the source
of all of their failures.

If only he had continued the

war instead of seeking peace, their policies might have been
vindicated.
When the terms of the American as well as the French
and Spanish treaties were revealed to Parliament on January

27, 1783 the onslaught against Shelburne began.

Loyalists,

Canadian fur traders and fishery interests commenced an outcry over what they viewed as unnecessary concessions to
Americans which had damaged them.

As Shelburne had fore-

seen, the greatest protests arose from the Loyalists and
their friends.

They ignored the promise implicit in the

King's opening speech
. . ·• I trust that you will agree with me, that a
due and generous attention ought to be shown towards
those who have relinquished their property or professions from motives of lo~alty to me, or attachment to the mother country.~
Instead, the Loyalists focused on their anticipations of
what would happen to Congressional recommendations to the

5Parliamentary History, XXIII, 206.
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states on property restitution and ending prosecutions.
Franklin's son, William, former royal governor of New
Jersey, was a leader among the American exiles in London
opposed to ratification of the Shelburne treaty, and insistent upon Parliamentary recognition of Loyalist claims.
The Earl of Carlisle, one-time head of the American
Peace Commission in 1778, led the attack on Shelburne in
the House of Lords on February 17th.

Carlisle claimed the

boundaries as drawn would insure the virtual loss of all
Canada.

He decried the abandonment of the Indian tribes

which had served the King loyally in the war, and deserved
protection from the colonists.

He ridiculed the treaty

provision by which Congress was to make recommendations to
the states in favor of the Loyalists.

He pointed out there

was not the slightest assurance the states would ever comply with this provision.

The loss of Penobscot, he added,

would cost Great Britain its vital supply of masts for
merchant and naval vessels.

The Canadian fur trade had been

dealt a death blow by the surrender of the forts which protected both the trade and the loyal Indians since these
posts were located south of the lakes on territory soon to
become American soil.

So far as the free navigation of the

Mississippi was concerned, it was a worthless concession
by the Americans in light of the Canadian fur trade situa-

tion.

In short, Great Britain, he charged, had not only
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granted independence to its colonies, it had made needless
additional concessions to the rebellious colonials and had
nothing to show for them in exchange. 6
Shelburne answered the accusations of betrayal of the
American Loyalists with a reiteration of the promise in the
King's message in opening Parliament, and defended the
treaty terms.
I have but one answer to give the House; it is the
same answer I gave my own bleeding heart. A part
must be wounded that the whole of the Empire may not
perish. If better terms could be had, think you
My Lord, that I would not have embraced them? I
had but the alternative either to accept the terms
proposed or continue the war.7
Shelburne's overall defense of the American treaty remains
baffling.

He chose not to outline his scheme of reconcilia-

tion and reunion, the plan for a close commercial tie
between the two nations and ultimate political association
at some future date.

A full exposition of the Peace Treaties as a first

instalment of revolutionary changes in imperial and
commercial policy was obviously impracticable. To
justify the generosity of the American Treaty on the
ground that it would induce the "revolted Colonies"
to enter a new form of association which would enable
them to compete on level terms with British citizens
throughout the Empire, would have a provoked explosion of contemptuous indignation. 8 ·

6
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So instead he was forced to hint somewhat indirectly at the
implications of free trade, a concept his listeners most
likely understood only dimly.

The weight of his arguments

defending the terms of the American treaty had to rest
almost wholly upon England's exhausted financial condition,
and upon the weakness of that nation's defense posture in

1782. 9
Shelburne went as far as he well could, denouncing
monoplies, urging Britain's essential interest in
free trade as a growing industrial nation, and
pleading in particular that the Americans should be
dealt with "on the footing of brethren." But, inevitably, there was something missing: the argument
was inconclusive.10
A more complete and convincing argument in support of
the treaty appeared in pamphlet form shortly.

Its author,

Andrew Kippis, argued,
It behooves those who made it, to recommend themselves to the public by promoting the principle
of it, whether in or out of Government. These are
a cordial intercourse with North America; a wellgrounded hope of returning affection, and then of
returning union; and the universal freedom of commerce. It becomes those who objected t~ the peace
equally to adhere to these principles.
Despite the weakness inherent in Shelburne's own exposition
of his views in support of the American Treaty, he won a

9Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 421.
10
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test of strength in the House of Lords by a thirteen-vote
majority of February 18, 1782. 12
In Commons, Shelburne's aides were less successful in
defending the treaty terms.

The first blow came on February

18th when the House, following the lead of John Cavendish
who accepted the peace and American independence as necessary but claimed the concessions to America were extravagant, voted down the Address of Acceptance on the treaty,
13
224-208.
Cavendish resumed the attack on February 21st
with five new motions on the American Treaty, including one
censuring the Ministry for its unnecessary concessions, and
another pledging compensation to the American Loyalists by
England.

Cavendish charged, "The concessions made to the

adversaries of Great Britain
.• are greater than they
,,14
were entitled to . .
The motion in favor of the

..

American Loyalists stated".

that this House do feel the

regard due from this nation to every description of men . • •
and to assure His Majesty that they shall take every proper
method to relieve them

1115

On the crucial question

of censure Shelburne's forces went down to defeat, 207 to
190, in the early morning hours of February 22nd.
12
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13
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later on February 24th, Shelburne submitted his resignation
to the King. 16
The first steps toward American reconciliation and
reunion, a peace treaty with generous terms and its ratification, had been accomplished.

But the cost had been high.

Ratification had come only by the slenderest of margins and
under circumstances which boded 111 for the continuation of
this policy.

Its chief architect was no longer in office

with the resignation of Shelburne.

The question now was by

whom and through what agencies was the remainder of the program to be pursued?
The strange combination of two old and bitter enemies,
Lord North and Charles James Fox, joining forces to bring
down Shelburne was a precursor of what was to come in the
next Ministry.

From the end of February until early April,

the King sought desperately to find some other--any other-acceptable Cabinet leadership with sufficient support in
Parliament.

In the end he had to accept the Fox-North duo,

technically a Ministry headed by the Duke of Portland, who
in actuality took no active role in the Government.

17

The interim between Shelburne's resignation and the
King's grudging acceptance of the Fox-North Ministry

16
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extended nearly seven weeks.

It was during this interlude

that a key part of the Shelburne reconciliation plan, amendments to the Navigation Act, which would have permitted
Americans a special status in Empire trade, were introducd
and debated in Parliament. 18 The bill would have authorAmerican produce for the time being to enter

ized ".

British ports on the same footing as British-owned, while
treating American ships carrying such produce as those of
other foreign states."

19

It would have also opened up trade

between British colonies and islands in America to American
shipping on the same terms as if the ships and cargoes were
British ownect. 20

While the bill was proposed as an interim

measure, it was an essential part of Shelburne's plan to
restore the trade between England and America, and to assure
that this commerce was not lost to England's continental
rivals, especially France.

21

The bill had no organized sup-

port because of Shelburne's earlier resignation.

The

Ministers who might have supported it were simply caretakers
awaiting the King's decision in selecting new Cabinet
18

Ibid., p. 451.

19
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leadership.

And there were dedicated foes waiting to attack

this plan of Shelburne's as they had the American Treaty.
The debate, March 7th, in Commons, found two of
America's one-time advocates--Burke and Fox--as well as its
Tory foes in opposition.

William Eden, whose project for

reconciliat1.on had been the springboard leading to the
Carlisle Commission, declared the proposal ". . . would
introduce a total revolution in our commercial system . .
In addition, Eden foresaw a weakening of England's
maritime strength since" . . . the Kingdom would lose the
great nursery for its seamen, and all the means of manning
ships in time of emergency." 2 3 His arguments came largely
from a pamphlet produced by John Holroyd, the Earl of
Sheffield, and widely circulated in England in the spring
of 1783.
Sheffield's Observations on the Commerce of the American States reads in retrospect like a blustery tirade on
why Britannia rules the waves.

From a starting point of

Britain's naval superiority over France, Sheffield moved on
to claim the general superiority of British manufactured
goods over those of all other nations and the inferior
quality of American raw materials.

Perhaps the climate of

British public opinion welcomed a little bravado after
22

23
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the humiliation of 1775 to 1782.

Sheffield viewed any con-

cessions to encourage American trade as completely unnecessary.
Instead of exaggerating the loss suffered by the
dismemberment of the empire, our thoughts may be
employed to more advantage in considering what our
situation really is, and what are the greatest
advantages that can be derived from it. It will be
found better than we expect; nor is the independence of the American States, notwithstanding their
connection with France, likely to interfere with
us . . . . 24
In short, Britain had everything going her way in the ___ _
American trade.

"Our remaining colonies on the continent

and islands, and the favourable state of English manufacturers, may still give us almost exclusively the trade of
America

rr25

Also Sheffield pointed out the weakness

of the United States as a trade rival operating under its
loose Articles of Confederation, predicting Congress would
be unable to control American shipping.

Canada, peopled by

American Loyalists and British settlers and blessed with a
stable government, would provide the provisions, lumber and
other goods required by the West Indies colonies which had
"

formerly come from the United States.

America would also

be dependent upon Great Britain to finance its tobacco
24 John Holroyd, Observations on the Commerce of the
American States (London, 1783) p. 101.

25 Ibid.,

p. 77.
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trade and thus England would continue to call the tune in
the only significant import required from America.

26

In only one respect did Sheffield perceive America as
a threat to British commerce.

The United States is not, he

wrote
. • • likely to interfere with us so essentially as
has been apprehended, except as to the carrying
trade, the nursery for seamen, and that it is in our
power to prevent in a considerable degree • . . •
~e must therefore retain the carrying trade whereever we possibly can.27
It was Sheffield's suggestion that the Barbary pirates with
encouragement from Great Britain would be sufficient to discourage American inroads into the British carrying trade in
the Mediterranean, and that the Navigation Acts as they
stood would guarantee the North Atlantic and West Indies
trade to Great Britain.

For Sheffield, Britain's strength

was her maritime supremacy, and the carrying trade the
assurance of its source of future manpower.

He was con-

vinced" • • • that the principle of the Navigation Act, must
be kept entire, and that the carrying trade must not in any
degree be given up. 1128
Suddenly, the trade restoration between America and
Great Britain became the center of a controversy involving

26 Ibid., p. 118.
27
p.
Ibid.,

28
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Britain's fear of France and Franco-American maritime
power.
Eden and Sheffield would have made little headway if
they had been merely championing the cause of shipbuilders against merchants. The remarkable change
in public opinion which they and a few others
achieved was due, not to economic argumen~~ but to
an emotional appeal, the emotion of fear. ~
Parliament referred the bill to Committee whence it
emerged no longer recognizable.30

One of Shelburne's major

efforts toward reconciliation and reunion--the restoration
of commercial ties--was clearly in serious trouble.

Mean-

while, after April 2, 1783, Charles James Fox as Foreign
Secretary was now in complete control of any negotiations
with the Americans in Paris on the terms of the definitive
peace treaty, and the re-establishment of trade relations
between England and America.

Oswald was promptly replaced

by David Hartley, a member of Parliament from Hull and an
advocate of American reconciliation.
on April 24th.

Hartley reached Paris

His instructions directed him" • . . to

treat for opening of British and American ports for mutual
commerce, and for trade arrangements based upon reciprocity."

31 However, the specifics were a little less than
29
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reciprocal in character.

The British proposal contemplated

the raw produce of America would be admitted into Great
Britain just as if the Thirteen States were still colonies.
·In return, the manufactured products of Great Britain were
to enter the United States on the same basis.

So far as the

West Indies were concerned, the British plan would have permitted Americans to have participated in that trade only
when carrying American produce to those Islands.3 2
The American Commissioners in Paris were suspicious of
Hartley's mission and its sincerity of purpose from the outset.

On presenting his Commission to the Americans, they

immediately pointed out it was not under Seal.
ultimately rectified three weeks later.33

This was

Despite these

concerns, the American Commissioners submitted to Hartley
on April 29th proposals that " • • • the rivers, harbors, and
ports of both countries, including areas under the dominion
of Great Britain, be opened to the citizens of the other. 11 34
This was reciprocity as the Americans understood it, but not
as Hartley had been directed to negotiate.

Hartley for-

warded the American proposal to London, incautiously indieating his approval of these ideas.

Within two weeks he had

32Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,
pp. 461-462.
33auttr1dge, David Hartley, M.P., p. 306.
34Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 431.
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a reply from Fox stating " • . • that you have either not
attended to or have misunderstood my Instructions • •

. .,,35

For Hartley's information Fox included a copy of an Order in
Council issued May 14th in London which limited American
exports to England to ". . • unmanufactured goods, or
merchandizes, being the growth or production of . • • the
United States. 11 36

The American Commissioners reacted

angrily to this style of reciprocity which discriminated
against American manufactured goods.

From the English

standpoint these limitations were reasonable.

American

manufactures were insignificant, but such a provision
" . • • might enable foreign goods, which were either prohibited or liable to heavy duties, to be passed off as
American, thus giving rise to innumerable frauds."37

Ameri-

can trading habits were well known to British officialdom as
a result of colonial experiences.
In spite of these disappointments, Hartley and the
American Commissioners continued meeting, Hartley suggested
another plan to Fox on May 22nd.

This would have re-

established Anglo-American trade relations on the same terms
35Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,
p. 467.
36Francis Wharton, editor, The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States {Washington, D.C.,
1889) VI.• 428 •
37Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,

p. 462.
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which prevailed in 1774 before the Revolution.

As proposed

this would have opened the West Indies trade to America with
minor limitations, and generally permitted American ships to
enter British ports on the same terms as British ships with
reciprocal privileges for English ships in American ports.38
The American Commissioners demanded to know if Hartley had
the authority to enter into such an agreement, should it be
acceptable to them.39

He admitted he would still have to

win Fox's and the Cabinet's approval of his plan, and agreed
to attempt it.

Fox's response directed Hartley to proceed,

but it was filled with warning signals.

The United States

must be barred from the carrying trade between the West
Indies and Great Britain, Fox emphaslzed.

He also ". . •

stressed the point that Britain had already granted to the
Americans special privileges which were denied other
nations • • • • " in the tobacco and rice trade through the
June 6th Orders in Counci1. 40
Another draft agreement was sent to London on June
20th.

The Americans were increasingly suspicious of Hart-

ley1 s proposals which they accepted, but came back from

38
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London rejected. 41

"In a word, it appears that his full

powers, which he had then received, authorized him to do
nothing," Henry Laurens reported to Philadelphia on June
17th. 42 John Adams was equally pessimistic in his evaluation, writing to Secretary Livingston on June 23rd,

"I see

no prospect of agreeing on any regulation of commerce here.
The present ministry are afraid of every knot of merchants. 1143

The final blow to American hopes was the Order

in Council July 2, 1783, which completely barred American
shipping from the West Indies trade while
• • • providing that American produce (i.e., all
kinds of lumber, livestock, cereals, and vegetables
might be imported into the British West Indies, and
that West Indian rum, molasses, coffee, cocoa-nuts,
ginger and pimento might be exported to the United
,States under the same regulations ~nd duties as if
exported to British North America.44
Adams wrote bitterly, "A jealousy of American ships,
seamen, carrying trade and naval power appears every day
more and more conspicuous. 114 5 Not only were the Americans
disappointed at the results of the commercial negotiations,
Britain's representative, Hartley, appears to have believed
41 Ibid., p. 476.
42
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43Ibid., 501
44Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,
p. 47§.
45The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the
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his confidence had been abused by the Ministry.

"Last eve-

ning Mr. Hartley spent two hours with me, and appeared much
chagrined at the Proclamation which had never been communicated to him by his principals," Adams noted to Livingston on July 17th.

46

Meanwhile, the answers to why the once promising outlook from a restoration of the Anglo-American had withered
were to be found in the quiet efforts of Lord North and
William Knox, former• undersecretary of the American Department, to scuttle the whole idea.

At North's invitation in

May, Knox went" . . . to work wlth the avowed purpose of
defeating the American policy advocated by the Foreign
,,47 Explaining his program some six
Secretary, Fox, .
years later, Knox said:
My general and correct knowledge of the whole
course of the American circuitous trade enabled me
to judge in what part of the chain the cutting out
a link would most effectually interrupt its progress and divert the navigation into our channel.
I therefore determined to • • • frame the regulations for the intercourse between the United States
and British West India Islands go as utterly to
exclude the American shipping. 4

There seems little doubt that Knox was successful in his
efforts.

46

"My draught of a bill • • • 'was converted into
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the Order in Council, passed the 2nd of July, i783, which
I wish may be engraved upon my tombstone, as having saved
the navigation of England, 1114 9 Knox boasted.
Thus, Knox whose service under Hillsborough, Dartmouth and Germain in the American Department, had been based
on the principle that the duty of colonies was to be ".
subservient to the maritime strength and commercial interests of Great Britain . . . " struck a final blow at
Shelburne's reconciliation and reunion policy.SO

When the

July 2nd Order in Council reached Paris negotiations were
suspended.

There was no point in further talks.

The com-

mercial treaty languished quietly and was dead by the time
the terms of the definitive treaty were signed on September

3, 1783.
In the end, reconciliation and reunion as a policy
could be no stronger than the men who espoused it.

Without

leaders of stature--politicians tough enough to command
respect--it was a rudderless ship.

From the hopeful begin-

nings in the springtime of 1782 it had run its course.

At

the end of the voyage were the rocks of patriotic emotionalism based upon fear, and the political realism of clinging
to mercantilism of the past.
49 Ibid., 480.
50
Ibid., 479.

CHAPTER VII
THE TREATY OF PARIS AND BRITAIN'S
RECONCILIATION POLICY
Reconciliation and reunion was an option of British
policy throughout the American Revolutionary period from
prewar 1774 through postwar 1783.

It was a less signifi-

cant option of American policy as well.

Throughout this

thesis I have sought to document and trace this policy's
evolution in these years, pulling together the scattered
threads from other more frequently considered themes.

Still,

there remain questions for which answers must be attempted
in a final evaluation of this neglected viewpoint and its
impact on a major assumption in American diplomatic history.
Why did reconciliation fail?

What was the signifi-

cance of Britain's policy on the final terms of the Treaty
of Paris?

Does this policy cause a re-evaluation of the

earlier assessments of the American diplomacy at Paris?
There was a surprising consistency in the reconciliation and reunion option of British policy throughout the
period considered.

It was always a part of every British

plan of strategy though sometimes muted because of its tandem role with military and naval efforts.

On occasion, in
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the American Peace Commission of 1778, and again during the
diplomacy of peace in 1782, the plan for reconciliation and
reunion became a dominant factor.
On the other hand, despite its constancy, it is
equally obvious that this policy altered shape and form to
a considerable extent over the years of its existence.

Lord

North's Conciliatory Proposals of 1775 bear little resemblance to the offers borne by Lord Carlisle's American Peace
Commission and less to Lord Shelburne's ultimate reconciliation efforts at Paris.

Reconciliation and reunion evolved

in response to the fortunes of war, diplomatic pressures
upon Great Britain and domestic events at home.

Perhaps its

greatest consistency were the forces which encouraged men
to pursue this policy in an effort first to prevent, and
then to halt the war.
In retrospect, it seems almost incredible that men of
goodwill in both America and England were unable to find the
key to reconciliation.

The pamphlets, diaries and Parlia-

mentary debates of this period are studded with references
to the ties which held together England and its North
American colonies.
• • • principles •
America.
l

Shelburne wrote of links of

. . habits.

11

1

11

•

•

•

blood

which united England and

Galloway, an American, observed that '! • • • the

Fitzmaurice, The Life of William Petty, Earl of Shelburne, p. 169.
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people of America are favourable and friendly to our
cause." 2 The Americans steadfastly based their appeals for
the repeal of distasteful Parliamentary measures or changes
in Ministerial policy on their rights as Englishmen or upon
what they understood to be the British constitution.

Thus,

it would appear an entire scheme of common traditions,
political thought, language, and predominantly Protestant
religious background was working in favor of reconciliation
and reunion both prior to and during the hostilities.
Though men spoke of a common heritage, shared traditions and the same religious principles, there is also
counter evidence of enormous differences between England and
America in 1774.

American institutions--political and

religious--had long since began to deviate from those in
England under the pressure of New World experiences.

These

institutions were also influenced by the thousands of settlers from continental European nations who had joined the
English colonists in North America.

America was not England

transplanted to another continent in either institutions,
people or spirit.

Scattereq in small sea coast cities and

in a sparsely populated wilderness, the Americans had become
by 1774 significantly different from Britons.
2 aalloway, Historical and Political Reflections on the
Rise and Progress of the American

R~bellion,

p.
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Nor could Americans willingly accept the role of
political and economic subservience in which they were cast
by at least some Englishmen.
cise.

Attitudes are at best impre-

There is, however, considerable evidence which sup-

ports the statement that colonies and colonials were created
as subordinate beings to serve the purposes of their creators.

"From this self-evident position, that colonies can

no longer be serviceable to a state, than they continue in
subordination to it, we must deduce our arguments," one
writer declared in 1776.3

Over and over Americans including

Benjamin Franklin and all of the men who served as colonial
agents in London, experienced that subtle but pervasive
British condescension toward those who are of a lesser
breed.

King George III wrote of the knavery of Americans.

Lord Sheffield ridiculed their pretension to trade.

There

were indeed powerful forces pushing both America and England
toward reconciliation through 168 years of common background
and political affiliation.

They were savagely undercut by

the inability of many Britons to see colonies and· colonists
in any other than a subordinate role.
The sinews of trade between Britain's North American
colonies and home island were another factor which should
have been a considerable force for reconciliation and

3Anonymous, Considerations on the American War (London,
1776) p. 15.
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reunion.

It was the support of British merchants trading

to North America which had brought sufficient pressures upon
Parliament in 1766 to repeal of the Stamp Act.

When the

final crisis came in 1774-1775, the one-time supporters of
the American viewpoint were disinterested.
The merchants' interest in American affairs and the
influence they could exert in behalf of the colonies had waned. As Burke noted, the commercial communities opposed to North's Administration "have not
been much regarded," while the "manufacturing parts
of the Kingdom" urged that "the reduction by force
of the disobedient spirit in the Colonies is their
Sole security for trading in future with America. 11 4
As the war progressed the value of the North American
colonies as trading partners continued to decline.

Adam

Smith and others advocated American independence as a positive benefit to British trade.
. . . I am glad, that America has declared herself
independent of us, though for reasons very opposite
to theirs. America, I have proved beyond the possibility of a confutation, ever was a millstone
hanging about the neck of this country to weight it
down,

wrote Josiah Tucker, Dean of Gloucester Cathedral, in 1783.
" • • • trade depends on Interest alone, and on no other
Connection or Obligation," .he added. 5
Sheffield's pamphlet and its appeal to British patriotism was a final and devastating blow to the favorable forces

4Michael Kammen, A Rope of Sand, p. 305.
5Josiah Tucker, Four Letters on Important National
Subjects Addressed to the Earl of Shelburne (London, 1783)
pp. 7-9.
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engendered by the trade ties between America and England.
His reasoned analysis against any commercial concessions to
American trade in the crucial period when the North-Fox
Ministry was preparing to take over destroyed Shelburne's
last move toward reconciliation.

One of Sheffield's sup-

porters· summed up a feeling shared by many Britons before
and after the war when he wrote, "The Colonies were originally settled to promote the navigation of England by
creating a great employment of ships. 116 In a simple, short
sentence the people of America were reduced to an economic
asset of the British Empire, helpful if properly subservient, but disposable if required.
Another force pressuring England's leaders toward
reconciliation and reunion emerged only after the military
conflict began.

It was the enormous financial and human

cost of conquering America--a matter which was greatly
underestimated by the North Ministry at the outset.

British

generals from Gage to Cornwallis pleaded for adequate manpower and were forced instead to make do with German mercenaries, Indian irregulars and American Loyalists.7
England simply was unable to recruit adequate manpower
within its own nation to fight a colonial war and a global
war simultaneously.
6aeorge Chalmers, Opinions on Interesting Subjects of
Public Law and Commercial Policy Arising from American Independence (London, 1784) p. 93.

7Robson, The American Revolution, pp. 114, 115.
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The financial burden for England of a stalemated, but
expanding warfare both in America and elsewhere was another
motivator favoring reconciliation and reunion.

Hartley

dubbed it, "A war which I can call by no other name than a
war of Ministers against the sentiments and real interests
of their country." 8 By 1780 the war had cost the Kingdom
at least~l00,000,000.9

This meant increased taxes which

the constituency represented by the country gentlemen in
Parliament would have to pay.

It was the desertion of this

faction from Lord North which sent his Ministry down to
defeat in March, 1782.

But both before and after that event

the costs of world-wide warfare were exerting increasing
pressures for peace, and for reconciliation and reunion.
The strains introduced by the long colonial war in
America also heated up pressures for domestic reforms within
England's Parliamentary structure, and added to the forces
of reconciliation and reunion.

Government corruption, mis-

management and waste were revealed by the desperate measures
necessity imposed on Lord North's administration.

The rise

of the County associations and the frightening Lord Gordon
riots were both indications that sheer incompetence could
conceivably topple the entire government structure.

The

8 Hartley, An Address to the Committee of the County
of' York, p. 25.

9 Ibid., p. 6.

'
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mismanagement of military and naval matters which cost the
nation whole armies, fleets and possessions seemed to go
far beyond mere miscalculation.

All of these elements added

fuel to the demands for reconciliation and reunion so that
the nation could move to remedy its critical deficiencies at
home.
Diplomatically, Great Britain by 1782 had become isolated from Europe.

She was at war with America, France,

Spain and Holland.

On paper, at least, the nations of most

of Europe were aligned against her in an armed neutrality
headed by Russia.

From a pinnacle of power at the Peace of

Paris in 1763 Britain had slipped dangerously close to the
precipice of facing a European continent united against her.
At the heart of Britain's diplomatic isolation was an issue
as emotional and bitter any nation has ever faced--the
alliance between France and the American colonies.
It was an unnatural alliance in the eyes of many.

A

Joining of forces between rebellious colonials and Britain"s
traditional continental and Catholic enemy was a vicious
repudiation of all which Britain stood for.

It might be

comparable in today's world perhaps, to the state of Alaska
declaring its independence of the United States and signing
a military alliance with Japan.

What made the Franco-

American alliance even more frightening than the centuries
of enmity across the channel was a widely held belief in the
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economic potential of America.

A substantial portion of

the United Kingdom's maritime strength in 1776 was Americanbuilt.10

America had been a key source of British naval

supplies as well as shipping.

Now suddenly these former

Imperial assets were to be made available to England's most
powerful continental enemy.

William Eden posed the fear

which was the mainspring of much of the forces of reconciliation and reunion when he said the question facing Britain
was
• • . whether we shall be deprived of our dependencies, be stript of our maritime power, become total
and immediate bankrupts to all the world and hold a
crippled trade and commerce hereafter at the goodwill and compassion of the House of Bourbon.11
And if the immediate military and naval outlook were insufficiently gloomy, those who looked ahead to future American
growth linked to French ambitions were even more fearful.
The possibility of France supplanting Great Britain as
America's trading partner added to the fears raised by contemplating the future impact of the Franco-American alliance.

If there is one thread which runs through writings of

contemporary Americans and Britons who labored for reconciliation and reunion, it is the weight and urgency given
by all to the alliance between the rebellious North American colonies and France.
p.

475.

10Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,
11

Eden, Four Letters to the Earl of Carlisle, p. 48.
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From the American standpoint the forces of reconciliation and reunion were substantially weaker than those
exerted within the British establishment.
theless real.

They were none-

The war was essentially a military stalemate

with the Americans never able to drive the enemy from their
major cities and seaports.

The countryside and the sea

coast were always vulnerable to raids in force.
of Indian attack hung over the frontier.
property and livelihood was widespread.

The threat

Destruction of
Galloway's estimate

that not more than one-fifth of the Americans supported
Congress from choice may have been low. 12

But it seems clear

that less than a majority of the inhabitants of the North
American colonies were active supporters of the rebellion.
And the Franco-American allia11ce was a factor in America,
too.

It was the issue which divided Congress into pro-

French and anti-French factions.

For the deep emotional com-

pulsions of traditional enmity and religion ran through the
American consciousness.

It moved some men like Galloway to

seek reconciliation and reunion over independence.
There were also powerful forces against reconciliation
and reunion from the English standpoint.

A fear of the con-

sequences of concessions to the North American colonies was
widespread.
12
p. 14.

~·-

The impact on the West Indian sugar islands,

Galloway, Considerations on the American Enquiry,
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Canada and, even closer to home, on Ireland, were incalculable.

The American example plus the dislocation of trade

which resulted from the American War produced conditions
close to rebellion in Ireland in 1778-1779.

The result was

action in Parliament in the winter of 1779-1780 to remove
restrictions which had formerly applied to Irish exports. 1 3
Further concessions to America could have unraveled the
fabric of empire from Bengal to Bermuda.

Trade losses to

colonies, which might have been a powerful factor for reconciliation and reunion, were lightly felt.

Through devious

channels trade continued between Britain and America
throughout the war.
Perhaps the most potent

o~

all factors militating

against reconciliation and reunion was the eternal optimism
of the British military and naval commanders.

There was

always the hope that this year's campaign or next year's
efforts would be the final blow, shattering the rebel armies
and encouraging loyal subjects to return to their allegiance
to the crown.

There were successes which encouraged the

British expectations--Howe's capture of Philadelphia, the
rebel capital in 1777, the fall of Charleston in 1780 and
the successful defense of Savannah in 1779--were all indicators pointing toward victory.

13Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,
p. 524.
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In the end reconciliation and. reunion failed as
policy.

From the American viewpoint the reasons can be

summed up briefly.

First and foremost the initiative for

action on this policy was essentially British.
actions were behind the surge of events.

Britain's

If Britain had

offered in 1775 the terms--dominion status--which the
American Peace Commission brought to the colonies in 1778,
they might well have been accepted.

Once the Franco-

American treaty was signed, William Eden's efforts were
futile.
Shelburne's sounding in 1782 were a furtherance of the
same futility.

Though never fully disclosed, the grand out-

line of a federal alliance and colonial autonomy, could well
have been acceptable to a war-weary America had it been
offered at the right moment in 1780.

By Yorktown, or in

1782, the opportunity had slipped away.
There are other elements which made reconciliation and
reunion unlikely elements in the American equation.

The

British Ministry had destroyed its own credibility with its
dualism of policy.

Coercion was combined with appeals for

a return to the old allegiance.

Appeals to a common heritage

and ancient shared traditions were mixed with threats of
punishment.

Political dissension was answered with troops.

Military commanders came to America empowered to both subdue and conciliate.

In the process British policy became
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blurred and ambiguous and uncertain.

To Americans recon-

ciliation and submission appeared to be not much different.
And the advantages which might accrue to Americans through
reconciliation were foreseen in greater substance through
independence.

War-time patriotism with its emotional claims

was the final blow dealt American reconciliation and reunion.
. surely there is more reason to convince us
that the Americans, dreading the ambitious designs
of' their insidious ally; destitute of the great resources of war; without men and without money;
their commerce lost, their forces generally defeated, and their country ruined by the ravages
and expences of the war, will see their own
interest, and embrace those terms when offered
which they would have accepted in the time of their
prosperity~

Galloway wrote with conviction. 1 4

His fellow Americans

found otherwise.
The failure of reconciliation and reunion in Britain
was in part a result of the interaction to the American
response as well as a result of its own internal weaknesses
of formulation and implementation.

In the years before

hostilities began and even prior to 1778 during the war
itself, the absence of foreign intervention provided a fertile seedbed for the nurturing of reconciliation and reunion.

Neither the men nor the measures were available to

14 aalloway, Historical and Political Reflections on the
Rise and Progress of the American Rebellion, p. 129.
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·make it a reality.

Those who advocated it were a minority

in Parliament and Great Britain.

Instead there was a de-

termination on the part of the Ministry and the majority in
Parliament to pursue coercion and submission as the solution
to the American problem.

After 1778 the Franco-American

Alliance became a monumental emotional and diplomatic road
block to reconciliation and reunion.
Another aspect of the inability of the reconciliation
and reunion movement to speak from strength was its identification with the reform element.

Those who spoke most fre-

quently for America were men like Shelburne, Barre, Burke,
Rockingham, Chatham, Wilkes and Hartley.

They were also men

linked to the forces of change, to economic doctrines at
odds with mercantilism and seekers· for electoral reform and
government efficiency.

The issue of reform attached itself

most closely to Shelburne and no doubt contributed to the
defeat he suffered in connection with the ratification of
the Treaty of Paris.
Moreover, the essence of Shelburne's Toryism was
its radical quality. Not only must the constitution be reinvigorated by a reform of Parliament,
but the financial and fiscal systems must be remodelled to suit the needs of a new age.15
15

p. 408.

Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire,
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To be sure the strength of the reform group, which tended
by and large to be composed of the same individuals supporting reconciliation and reunion with America, had its peaks
and valleys.
zenith.

Early 1780 saw the Association movement at its

It went into a decline in the general revulsion

toward ·dissidents which followed the Lord Gordon riots in
June, 1780.

Again in early 1782 when Parliament halted the

war in America by its vote on General Conway's motion, the
reform group was strong.

Reform power was ebbing by late

1782 after the spectacular naval victory over the French
at the Battle of the Saints in April, 1782 and the failure
of the siege of Gibraltar in September of the same year.
Perhaps one cause for the failure of reconciliation
and reunion was the fact it dealt in concepts and ideas unfamiliar to eighteenth century minds.

From their earliest

beginnings the colonies in North America had been conceived
as dependencies which added to the political and economic
strength of Great Britain.

Now Adam Smith was arguing that

exactly the opposite was true, " • . • that under a mercantilist system Britain received nothing but loss from her
control of colonies .

Here was a refutation of a

truth which generations accepted.

The past and what it

stands for has a stubborn way of lingering in the minds of

16

Ibid., p. 488.
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men long after the circumstances of the past have vanished.
The comfortable, conventional wisdom of colonial subservience expounded by William Knox and Lord Sheffield found
far more willing listeners than did the novel economic doctrines of Andrew Kippis and Lord Shelburne.
What was the ultimate impact of this policy of reconciliation and reunion upon the diplomacy which produced the
Treaty of Paris and American independence?
Beyond a doubt it weighed heavily in the terms of the
settlement through influences exerted for several reasons.
Chance, luck and some skillful maneuvering by the American
Peace Commission placed the direction of England negotiations for peace in the hands of Lord Shelburne, the leading
advocate of reconciliation and reunion.

Charles James Fox,

foreign secretary, almost succeeded in snatching the reins
away from Shelburne.

But even the tempting offer of inde-

pendence Fox's representative, Thomas Grenville, brought to
Paris in May, 1782 was not enough for Franklin to abandon
Shelburne.

Instead, Franklin shrewdly encouraged the rift'

between Grenville and Oswald, and the Cabinet conflict in
England between Fox and Shelburne.

17 The death of Rocking-

ham put the exponent of reconciliation and reunion on whom
Franklin was betting, in complete control of negotiations.
17

Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 279.
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The Shelburne conception of peace was a generous one.
That it shall be done decidedly, so as to avoid all
future risk of enmity, and lay the foundation of a
new connection better adapted to the present temper
and interests of both countries . •
18
were the instructions to Oswald on July 27, 1782.
Those
words succinctly sum up the grand strategy of long range
reconciliation and reunion pursued by Shelburne and his
emissary, Oswald.
The terms of the Treaty of Paris were as generous as
Shelburne intended them to be--so generous they cost him his
place in government.

The terms began with the absolute

independence the Americans demanded.

They included bound-

aries which exceeded those which even America's French and
Spanish allies thought reasonable. 1 9 In a conversation with
the French diplomat, Gerard Reyneval, shortly before the
conclusion of the preliminary American treaty, Shelburne
said,
• • • there would be little difficulty about Boundarys with the American Commissioners, providing the
Article relative to the Loyalists was express 1 d in
so comprehensive a manner as to acquit Your
Majesty . • .20
Of course, the articles on the Loyalists as finally written
in the treaty were scarcely worth the paper on which they

18 Fitzmaur1ce, The Life of William P~tty, Earl of
Shelburne, p. 169.
l9Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 391.
2 °Fortescue, Correspondence of King George III, VI,
161.
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appeared so far as protecting the lives or the property of
Loyalists.

Finally, timing played a critical role in shap-

ing the Treaty of Paris.

Lord Shelburne's shakey position

demanded that the peace treaty be accomplished before Parliament resumed in the fall of 1782 or else the whole
structure of peace he was seeking to build might collapse
in the fall on his Ministry. 21 Hence there was an enormous
pressure upon Shelburne's representatives to find compromises and make concessions to the Americans in an effort
to bring the negotiations to a quick end.
The impact of Britain's policy of reconciliation and
reunion was enormous.

It established the outlines of the

agreement through its conceptualization of an ultimate
reunion between England and America.

The specific terms of

the treaty were shaped by the expectations of the reconciliation and reunion policy.

The tactics of negotiation

placed the British negotiators in a critically weak bargaining position in the vital final weeks when Shelburne desperately sought his final agreement before Parliament's
reopening in December, 1782.

All of these factors were

beyond the grasp of American control.

True, Franklin ex-

ploited the British policy to America's benefit by steering
negotiations away from Fox, and encouraging Shelburne's
representatives.
21Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 372.
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Have American historians such as Bemis and Morris
given America's Peace Commissioners at Paris more credit
than their diplomatic record deserves?

Before answering

that question, let us recall the statements by Bemis and
Morris, analyzing and praising the success of American diplomacy at Paris.
Their action was the first decisive step to loose
a new nation • • • • so that their people after
them might have freedom to expand . • . • The
greatest victory in the annals of American diplomacy • • ••
writes Bemis. 22 Morris confirms Bemis by calling the American diplomacy at Paris " • • • remarkable • • • • From beginning to end they remained unswerving on the score of obtaining both absolute independence and a continental domain
,,23
Both Bemis and Morris agree on the success of

..

American diplomacy, and on the criteria for gauging it-independence and territorial concessions from Great Britain.
Independence was never a serious question after the
fall of the North Ministry on March 20, 1782.

The Rocking-

ham Cabinet took office on a pledge from the King he would
not veto it.

For a short time Shelburne explored the pos-

sibilities of independence coupled with some sort of union
or alliance between Great Britain and America.

By July,

22 Bemls, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution,
p. 256.

23

Morris, The Peacemakers, p. 459.
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1782 he had abandoned even this remote possibility for
absolute independence and a future hope of reunion.

Inde-

pendence was no sticking point in the negotiations for
either Shelburne or for Fox if events had given the negotiators' role to him.
On boundaries it is equally clear, the British were
determined to make peace generously in hope of future
American friendship and trade.

British demands on the old

Northwest Territory were intended to produce nothing more
than somewhat better terms for the American Loyalists,
Shelburne's own statement on that score indicates an intent
to provide the new nation with spacious boundaries.

These

would encourage westward expansion and hopefully divert
American interest from a maritime rivalry with Great
Britain.
So the answer to the question of American diplomacy is
clear.

The pursuit of Britain's neglected policy of recon-

ciliation and reunion leads to no other conclusion than that
Bemis and Morris have overstated the case for the success of
Franklin, Jay and Adams.

An examination of the British side

of the negotiating ledger shows as many entries as does the
American.

A large part of proclaimed American success re-

veals itself as British policy not American skill.

Both

British policy as well as American objectives must be
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considered before a balanced picture of the Anglo-American
diplomacy at the Treaty of Paris emerges in full detail.
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